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Abstract
Collusion sustainability depends on ﬁrms’ aptitude to impose suﬃciently severe punish-
ments in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We extend results from the literature
on optimal collusion by investigating the role of limited liability. We examine all situations
in which either structural conditions (demand and technology), ﬁnancial considerations (a
proﬁtability target), or institutional circumstances (a regulation) set a lower bound, possibly
negative, to ﬁrms’ proﬁts. For a large class of repeated games with discounting, we show that,
absent participation and limited liability constraints, there exists a unique optimal penal code.
It commands a severe single-period punishment immediately after a ﬁrm deviates from the col-
lusive stage-game strategy. When either the participation constraint or the limited liability
constraint bind, there exists an inﬁnity of multi-period punishment paths that permit ﬁrms
to implement the optimal collusive strategy. The usual front-loading scheme is only a speciﬁc
case and an optimal punishment proﬁle can take the form of a price asymmetric cycle. We
characterize the situations in which a longer punishment does not perform as a perfect substi-
tute for more immediate severity. In this case the lowest discount factor that permits collusion
is strictly higher than without the limited liability constraint, which hinders collusion.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72; D43; L13
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we characterize the implementability of a collusive strategy by oligopolistic ﬁrms
when their ability to punish deviations over one or several periods is limited.
Firms in the same industry may increase proﬁts by coordinating the prices they charge or
the quantities they sell. In a legal context in which collusive agreements cannot be overtly en-
forced, and future proﬁts are discounted, it is well-known that an impatient ﬁrm may ﬁnd it
privately proﬁtable to deviate from a collusive strategy. This renders collusive agreements funda-
mentally unstable. However, ﬁrms may design non-cooperative discipline mechanisms that help
implementing collusion.
Many papers examine the structural conditions that facilitate the formation of cartels. Most
theoretical analyses rely on a class of dynamic models usually referred to as supergames. These
models feature a repeated market game in which ﬁrms maximize a ﬂow of discounted individual
proﬁts by non-cooperatively choosing a price or a quantity over an inﬁnite number of periods.
When a deviation can be credibly and suﬃciently “punished” via lower industry prices or larger
quantities in subsequent time periods, conditions on structural parameters can be derived which,
when satisﬁed, make collusion stable.
A majority of recent contributions to the literature investigate the impact of various model
speciﬁcations on the sustainability of collusion with stick-and-carrot mechanisms in the style of
Abreu (1986, 1988). In this category of mechanisms, if a ﬁrm deviates from collusion, all ﬁrms
play a punishment strategy over one or several periods — the stick — which is more severe than
Nash reversion (i.e., it leads to lower instantaneous proﬁts, possibly negative) before returning
to a collusive price or quantity. If a deviation occurs in a punishment period, the punishment
phase restarts, otherwise all ﬁrms resume the collusive behavior to earn supernormal proﬁts — the
carrot. More speciﬁcally, Abreu (1986) exploits a single-period punishment mechanism for a class
of repeated quantity-setting oligopoly stage games with symmetric sellers of a homogenous good,
constant positive marginal costs, and no ﬁxed cost. For a given discount factor, the most severe
punishment strategy — following a deviation either from the collusive path or from a punishment
rule — that sustains collusion, is characterized. It results in the highest level of discounted collusive
proﬁts.
Our objective is to enrich the study of the circumstances that facilitate collusion, or make it
more diﬃcult to sustain.1 This is done by investigating the exact role of an assumption, in the
1The analysis of the connection between structural conditions and collusion stability with a stick-and-carrot
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seminal paper by Abreu (1986), according to which the price is strictly positive for all levels of
industry output, so that there is no ﬂoor for ﬁrms’ losses when the constant marginal cost is also
speciﬁed above zero. Indeed the quantity sold — and related costs — tend to inﬁnity when ﬁrms
charge below the marginal cost and the price approaches zero. In that case, the single-period
punishment that follows a deviation can be made as severe as needed. Although the strategy set
is assumed to be ﬁnite, the upper bound to the available quantities is so high as to never be used
as a punishment action that sustains collusion.
To our knowledge, most papers — if not all — that refer to Abreu (1986, 1988) actually overlook
this key assumption by introducing more structure. They typically borrow the same stick-and-
carrot mechanism with a single punishment period, although they either assume that demand is
ﬁnite at all prices, or that ﬁrms have limited production capacity. It follows that losses are bounded
from below in a punishment period, and collusion can be hindered. In that case, an extension
of the punishment phase to several periods appears as a natural substitute for more immediate
severity. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 165) emphasize that, when the severity of punishments
is limited the punishment phase should be longer, although “it is not obvious precisely which
actions should be speciﬁed” in the punishment phase. Our paper is novel in that it thoroughly
examines this point. This is done in a setup that encompasses the main assumptions in Abreu
(1986). In our model, ﬁrms sell substitutable goods (possibly diﬀerentiated), inverse demand
functions are non-increasing (they can be ﬁnite at all prices), the marginal cost is constant and
non-negative (it can be zero), and there can be a ﬁxed cost. In addition to standard incentive and
participation constraints, a key speciﬁcation that we introduce is the limited liability constraint,
which amounts to imposing a limitation on the lowest level of proﬁts a ﬁrm may earn. Whether
the limited liability constraint binds or not impacts ﬁrms’ choices of price or quantity in the
punishment phase.
Interestingly, a limited liability constraint is not a technical sophistication that we add to
standard speciﬁcations. It is de facto present, or latent, in all models where demand or tech-
nological conditions set a lower bound to ﬁrms’ losses. A ﬁnite demand, or a limited capacity,
are examples of structural speciﬁcations that constrain ﬁrms’ payoﬀs to remain above a certain
(non-positive) level. Then, ﬁrms’ losses also remain ﬁnite when the prices they charge are below
their unit costs of production. This limits the maximal severity of punishment schemes.
In this case, a ﬁrm with high ﬁxed and/or variable costs earns more negative payoﬀs during
aggressive pricing episodes than more eﬃcient ﬁrms. This oﬀers a new explanation for an empirical
mechanism à la Abreu has been extended to many aspects. The literature is brieﬂy reviewed in a dedicated section
that follows our main results.
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observation by Symeonidis (2003), who ﬁnds strong evidence that collusion is more likely in
industries with high capital intensity. This result has been interpreted as a consequence of high
barriers to entry.2 Another possible and more direct interpretation, which we investigate below
(see the linear example in section 5), is that high average costs — which permit severe punishments
— facilitate collusion.
It is also well-known that ﬁnancial parameters (e.g., a return on investment target) may also
shape the limited liability constraint. For example, prudential ratios set a limit to the quantity
of loans a bank may supply. Another example is that ﬁnancial markets constrain managers of
equity-dependent ﬁrms not to post low operational proﬁts for too long. The empirical literature
has evidenced the connection between stock prices and ﬁrms’ investments, as in Baker et al.
(2003). Our theoretical analysis establishes that there is also a link between ﬁnancial constraints
and the ability to collude.
Finally, the limited liability constraint can capture all real-world contexts in which institu-
tional circumstances (e.g., regulation) impact ﬁrms’ behavior. An example of a regulatory measure
that reduces the severity of punishments is a price ﬂoor. As it rules out severe punishments, it
should hinder collusion. In an empirical paper, Gagné et al. (2006) study the impact on prices of
a price ﬂoor established by the Quebec provincial government on the retail market for gasoline.
By limiting the severity of price wars, the ﬂoor was seen as a means to reduce the ability of ﬁrms
to punish retailers deviating from a high price strategy. The analysis reveals that the net eﬀect of
the ﬂoor on average price-cost margins is near zero. The impact of the ﬂoor on retail prices in low
margin periods (or price wars) is actually oﬀset by the rise in their average duration. Price wars
are less severe, but they last longer.3 Our analysis oﬀers theoretical grounds to these empirical
ﬁndings.
In this paper, by delineating the largest parameter space for which a collusive strategy can be
implemented, we fully characterize the conditions under which the limited liability constraint does
reduce the ﬁrms’ ability to implement a given collusive action (a price or a quantity), in a large
class of models where the duration of punishments can be adjusted. For given cost and demand
2 In Symeonidis (2003), the capital stock of the average plant, and the capital-labor ratio, are proxies for high
barriers to entry, which in turn are seen to facilitate collusion. See also Levenstein and Suslow (2006).
3The introduction of a price ﬂoor followed a price war. The local association of independent gasoline retailers
reported that the price war “resulted in retail prices that were observed well below wholesale prices. It was so severe
as to force several independent retailers either to close down temporarily or to exit the market” (translated from
the Mémoire de l’Association Québécoise des Indépendants du Pétrole, June 1998, pp. 7-8). In another empirical
analysis of the impact of this regulation, Houde (2008) ﬁnds that the minimum retail price ﬂoor had a signiﬁcant
impact on the ﬁrms’ option value of staying in the market.
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parameters, the optimal punishment path is deﬁned as a vector of prices or quantities, played
period after period, that let ﬁrms implement a given collusive strategy for the lowest admissible
discount factor. When only incentive constraints are at play, there is a unique optimal punishment
path.
When the limited liability constraint is slack, we ﬁnd that the possibility to punish over several
periods does not result in a lower threshold for the discount factor than with a single-period
punishment scheme that we use as a benchmark. This also holds with a binding participation
constraint. The latter speciﬁes a minimum continuation payoﬀ following a deviation, but says
nothing on the distribution of this payoﬀ over time.
When the limited liability constraint binds, we ﬁnd that there exists an inﬁnity of simple
punishment paths that permit ﬁrms to implement the collusive strategy. The lowest discount
factor for which a given collusive strategy can be implemented strictly decreases if the punishment
phase is not limited to a single period. We establish that this discount threshold is always
reached with a punishment phase of ﬁnite length. Only in particular circumstances, which we
characterize, the discount threshold is as low as in the case without the limited liability constraint.
In all other cases, the discount threshold remains strictly higher than in the absence of a limited
liability constraint. In other words, a longer punishment with discounting oﬀers only an imperfect
substitute for more immediate severity. This means that, although the duration of the punishment
phase is not bounded, the limited liability constraint hinders collusion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In section
3, we restrict the duration of a punishment phase to a single period and identify the largest space
of parameters for which a collusive strategy can be implemented. In section 4, we obtain the
main results by investigating the impact of punishing over several periods on the ﬁrms’ ability to
collude. In section 5, the latter results are illustrated in the context of a linear Cournot model.
In section 6 we discuss our results in the light of the related literature. Section 7 concludes.
Due to space limitation, several intermediate results and detailed proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
2 The Model
We construct a supergame, in which symmetric ﬁrms in N = {1, . . . , n} supply substitutable
goods, possibly diﬀerentiated, to maximize individual intertemporal proﬁts by simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choosing a strategy ai — or “action” — that is either a price or a quantity
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in an inﬁnitely repeated stage game over t = 1, 2, ...,∞. Each ﬁrm’s action set A is an interval
of R+. The discount factor δ = 1/(1 + r), where r is the single-period interest rate, is common
to all ﬁrms. The continuous function πi : R2+ → R relates ﬁrm i’s proﬁts to a vector of actions
a ≡ (ai, a−i), where a−i describes a symmetric action chosen by all ﬁrms in N\{i}. We omit the
subscript i and specify a single argument a, which is a scalar, to represent the proﬁts π(a) earned
by ﬁrms that all choose the same action. Similarly, we denote by πdi (a) the proﬁts ﬁrm i earns
when it “deviates”, in that it plays its best reply to a, as played by all other ﬁrms. The set of
available actions includes a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy aNE , implicitly
deﬁned by πdi (aNE)− π(aNE) = 0, all i, and a collusive action, am, which yields more proﬁts (it
maximizes joint proﬁts when am = a∗m, a case of “perfect” collusion, as in the example we present
in section 5). Firms’ actions may diﬀer from period to period. An action path {at}∞t=1 is deﬁned
as an inﬁnite stream of n-dimensional vectors of actions, as chosen by each ﬁrm in each period.
We give more structure to the analysis by relating each ﬁrm i’s proﬁts πi = piqi − C (qi),
where pi is a price qi a quantity, to the exact properties of cost and demand conditions. There
are three basic assumptions:
(A1) Firms incur a ﬁxed cost f ≥ 0, and a variable cost c (qi) ≥ 0, to sell substitutable goods
(possibly diﬀerentiated), and their strategic variable is either a (non-negative) price (a = p
in the Bertrand speciﬁcation) or quantity (a = q in the Cournot speciﬁcation).
(A2) Firm i’s inverse demand function pi : Rn+ → R+ is non-increasing and continuous.
(A3) pi (0) > c and limqi→∞ pi (qi,q−i) = 0, any q−i in R
n−1
+ .
The main features of our model appear clearly when compared with the speciﬁcations in Abreu
(1986), a reference, where the following three assumptions hold: ( A1) Firms sell a homogeneous
good at constant marginal cost c > 0, and their strategic variable is quantity; ( A2) The market
inverse demand function p(q) : R+ → R+ is strictly decreasing and continuous in q =

i∈N qi;
and ( A3) p (0) > c and limq→∞ p (q) = 0. Note that the latter two assumptions imply that, for all
levels of total output q, the price p is strictly positive. They also imply that there exists qc > 0
such that p (qc) < c. This says that ﬁrms can always force the price p at which ﬁrm i sells qi
down to a level strictly below c. In this case there is no ﬂoor for ﬁrms’ losses since the quantity
sold — and related costs — can tend to inﬁnity when p approaches 0. The latter three assumptions
are encompassed by (A1-A3). Note that our assumptions also capture circumstances in which the
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price pi is driven down to exactly zero with ﬁnite quantities (qi,q−i), a case ruled out by Abreu’s
assumptions ( A1- A3).4
As in Abreu (1986) we construct a “stick-and-carrot” penal code. All ﬁrms initially collude
by choosing the collusive action am. If this action is played by all ﬁrms in all periods, each ﬁrm
earns the discounted sum of the single-period (positive) collusive proﬁts πm ≡ π (am). All ﬁrms
have a short-run incentive to deviate, that is to lower (increase) its own price (quantity) in order
to increase individual proﬁts at every other ﬁrm’s expense. If such a deviation is detected in
period t, all ﬁrms switch to the punishment action aP , in period t + 1 (the stick). The choice
of a low (high) punishment price (quantity) aP renders a free-riding behavior less attractive. If
any deviation from aP is detected, the punishment phase restarts, otherwise all ﬁrms resume the
collusive behavior by adopting the same am forever (the carrot).
In order to express results and related proofs with notational parsimony, independently of the
price and quantity speciﬁcations, hereafter we adopt the deﬁnition that the action a′, as chosen
by all ﬁrms, is more severe to ﬁrm i than (strictly less severe than) a when πi(a′) ≤ (>)πi(a).
This is denoted by a′ i (≻i)a, where the subscript is omitted whenever no ambiguity is likely to
result.
A key feature of the paper is that we investigate the consequence of having a lower bound
to individual punishment actions, and thereby to punishment proﬁts. We refer to this lower
bound aP i aNE , for all i in N , as the most severe symmetric punishment action, a parameter.
Given aP , we deﬁne π ≡ π (aP ) ≤ π (aNE). Most realistic circumstances oﬀer a justiﬁcation
for this setting. It can capture the impact of a regulatory measure. For example, a price ﬂoor
will impose ﬁrms to charge above a given value (say, a wholesale price), and then will limit the
severity of punishment actions (in some cases we may have π > 0). More generally, the severity
of punishments is also limited when the demanded quantity is ﬁnite at any price, including zero,
for all ﬁrms.5 As indicated above, there is no such constraining limit on punishments in Abreu
4 In Abreu (1986, Assumption (A4), p. 195) each ﬁrm’s strategy set is deﬁned on a ﬁnite interval of quantities
Si = [0, q¯ (δ)], where q¯ (δ) satisﬁes πi (q¯ (δ) , 0) < − δ1−δ supqi πi (qi, 0), in our notation. This means that q¯ (δ) is
speciﬁed to be greater than the quantity a ﬁrm should sell to incur a loss equal in magnitude to the continuation
proﬁts, computed from the next period onward, it would earn as a monopolist in all periods forever. This upper
bound in fact is so high as to be always greater than the single-period punishment quantity that sustains optimal
collusion (see proof of Lemma 8, p. 201).
5 In two related papers, Yasuda (2009) and Beviá, Corchón, and Yasuda (2011) introduce a similar speciﬁcation in
order to study how ﬁnancial constraints aﬀect collusion equilibrium payoﬀs and ﬁrms’ behavior in repeated games.
Yasuda (2009) shows in particular that, with a single-period punishment stick-and-carrot mechanism adapted from
Abreu (1986), collusion in which Cournot duopolists equally divide a monopoly proﬁt in each period may not be
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(1986).6 However, we may point to such a ﬂoor in more applied and recent contributions to the
literature. When the marginal cost is constant and set equal to zero, as in Häckner (1996) or
Compte et al. (2002), for examples, the lowest possible proﬁts are zero. Another example is
Vasconcelos (2005), where there is a variable marginal cost and a ﬁnite demand, so that proﬁts
can be negative but limitedly so. Our more general speciﬁcation also captures these cases.
We now introduce a few additional assumptions that are needed to produce formal results:
(A4) πi(ai,a
′
−i) ≤ (>)πi(ai,a−i) for all all ai i am if a′−i i (≻i)a−i.
This assumption speciﬁes the extension of the order relation to vectors of actions.7
Another speciﬁcation of the model relates to deviation proﬁts. A ﬁrm can earn positive
beneﬁts by playing its best reply to all other ﬁrms’ action, only if the latter action is not too
severe. Formally:
(A5) There exists a˜P i aNE such that πdi (a) ≤ (>)0 if and only if a i (≻i)a˜P .
When all ﬁrms in N\{i} play a ≻i a˜P , the latter assumption implies that ﬁrm i’s gross
deviation proﬁts are strictly higher than the level of ﬁxed costs, that is f . A consequence of (A5)
is that π (aNE) ≥ 0.
Although the analysis focuses on situations with limited punishments, the latter may be very
severe. A reference action that measures this severity is aˆP , which is such that the minmax proﬁt
is obtained by stopping production. We assume that:
sustainable. Beviá, Corchón, and Yasuda (2011) also specify that proﬁts must be greater than or equal to an
exogenously given value, which is non-positive. They characterize the allocations which can be sustained as an
equilibrium of a dynamic oligopoly model when no ﬁrm can be forced to bankruptcy by any other ﬁrm satisfying
the ﬁnancial constraint. In both papers, a ﬁrm is assumed to go bankrupt if its proﬁts are driven below the ﬁnancial
threshold. This can be interpreted as a very severe form of punishment, as a binding ﬁnancial constraint is assumed
to result in zero continuation proﬁts. Our analysis is thus complementary, since in the present paper a binding
limited liability constraint does not imply bankruptcy. It only sets a limit to the severity of punishments, which
may be possibly associated to positive proﬁts, as in the case of a proﬁt target imposed by ﬁnancial markets pressure.
6 In contrast, in the present model, the most severe punishment π can be arbitrarily close to the Nash payoﬀ
π (aNE).
7 In the Bertrand (resp. Cournot) speciﬁcation, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts are often non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing)
with other ﬁrms’ symmetric price (resp. quantity), so that if p′−i ≤ p−i (or q
′
−i ≥ q−i) then p
′
−i i p−i (and
q′−i i q−i). This, however, does not hold in all cases. For example, in a simple price-setting oligopoly model with
perfect substitutes and a constant positive marginal cost c, if pi < pNE = c then for all p′−i < pi < p−i we have
p′−i ≻i p−i.
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(A6) There exists aˆP i a˜P such that πdi (a) = (>)− f if and only if a i (≻i)aˆP .
In terms of output quantity, let qdi (a) denote ﬁrm i’s best-reply to a, as chosen by all other
ﬁrms. Assumption (A6) speciﬁes that qdi (a) = 0 if a i aˆP , and qdi (a) > 0 otherwise. In words,
any action a, as chosen by all ﬁrms in N\{i}, that is strictly more severe than aˆP , drives ﬁrm
i’s proﬁt-maximizing output to zero. In particular, if aˆP i aP , then the most severe symmetric
punishment action, when played by all ﬁrms in N\{i}, is suﬃciently penalizing as to lead ﬁrm i
to stop producing, and thereby to incur losses equal to the magnitude of ﬁxed costs, its minmax
value. Note that if aˆP i a ≻i aP we have π(a) > π, although qdi (a) = qdi (aP ) = 0 so that ﬁrm i’s
best-reply proﬁt is πdi (a) = π
d
i (aP ) = −f ≤ 0. To gain familiarity with the notation, observe that
when ﬁrms’ strategic variable is price, and c = f = π = 0, as commonly assumed for simplicity
in many existing models, we have a˜P = aˆP = aP = 0, a particular case.
When no constraint on the severity of a is introduced, as in most contributions to the literature,
proﬁts π (a) are unbounded from below. In that case, since best-reply proﬁts πdi (a) do have a
lower bound (a ﬁrm may always stop selling; see (A6)), we have πdi (a)− π (a) unbounded from
above. Recalling that πdi (aNE) − π (aNE) = 0, we know there exists at least one aˇ i aNE
verifying πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ) = πdi (am)− πm > 0. Finally we specify uniqueness, for simplicity:
(A7) There exists a unique aˇ ≺i am such that πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ) = πdi (am)− πm.
Clearly aˇ ≺i aNE (since aˇ i aNE by deﬁnition and πdi (aNE)−π (aNE) = 0 < πdi (am)−πm).
Note that (A7) is very mild. It captures in particular all usual situations in which the incentive
to deviate πdi (a)− π(a) increases with the severity of actions a i aNE , and also with the level of
collusion a ≻i aNE .8
In what follows we investigate the role of the parameter aP , that is the most severe punishment
action, on the implementation of collusion. This is done by ﬁrst considering situations in which
the duration of punishments is limited to a single period.
3 The Benchmark
In this section, as a benchmark, we restrict the duration of the punishment phase to a single period.
For each player to have no incentive to deviate, a deviation must be followed by a punishment
8For an illustration with quantity-setting ﬁrms see Fig. 2 in Abreu (1986). The formalization in the present
paper is more intuitive when a is interpreted as a price.
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that leads the discounted ﬂow of proﬁts to be less than the stream of collusive equilibrium proﬁts.
Moreover, for the punishment to be a credible threat, one should verify that ﬁrms do implement
the punishment action. This occurs if individual gains to deviate from the punishment phase are
smaller than the loss incurred by prolonging the punishment.9 Formally, the proﬁle {am, aP},
with aP  am (this is for all i, so we can drop the subscript for the order relation), must satisfy
two incentive constraints, we refer to hereafter as IC0 and IC1, that is
πdi (am)− πm ≤ δ [πm − π(aP )] , (IC0 )
πdi (aP )− π(aP ) ≤ δ [πm − π(aP )] , (IC1)
where π(a) denotes a ﬁrm’s stage proﬁt when all competitors choose the same action a, and πdi (a)
is ﬁrm i’s proﬁt from a one-shot best deviation from the action a selected by all rivals in N\{i}.
The ﬁrst condition says that the proﬁts associated with a deviation from the collusive action must
be smaller than what is lost due to the punishment phase. The second condition says that the
beneﬁts associated with a deviation from the punishment must be smaller than the loss incurred
by prolonging the punishment by one more period.
Our objective is to delineate the largest space of parameters for which the two constraints are
satisﬁed. The problem we investigate is thus to ﬁnd a punishment aP that minimizes δ under
the two incentive constraints (IC0 -IC1). The solution a∗P , deﬁned as the optimal punishment,
yields δ∗, the minimum. Before introducing additional constraints, we characterize a∗P and δ
∗ by
presenting three intermediate results.
Lemma 1. The optimal single-period punishment action a∗P and the discount factor lower bound
δ∗ are such that (IC0 ) and (IC1) hold with equality.
Proof. Suppose that a = a∗P , the optimal punishment is in the interior of A (it is always possible
to deﬁne A for this condition to hold), and δ = δ∗, the lowest possible discount factor for which
am is implementable. There are three possible cases: either the two inequalities are slack, or only
one, or none. Consider the ﬁrst two cases in turn. (i) If none of the two constraints binds, observe
that the two expressions on the RHS of the inequality sign are continuous in δ and monotonically
decreasing when the discount parameter is decreasing, so that there exists δ′ < δ∗ such that the
system still holds true when δ = δ′, contradicting the claim that δ∗ is a lower bound. (ii) If exactly
9 In a trigger penal code à la Friedman (1971), a deviation implies that ﬁrms stop colluding and revert to the
one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium forever. The punishment action is then self-enforcing. A stick-and-carrot
setup authorizes a more severe (and also shorter) punishment phase that may lead ﬁrms to earn negative proﬁts
for some time. It is not self-enforcing unless (IC1) holds.
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one constraint binds for δ = δ∗, recall that proﬁt functions πdi (.) and π(.) are continuous in ﬁrms’
choices, therefore by changing slightly the punishment action from a∗P to a
′
P one can relax the
binding constraint and still let the other inequality be veriﬁed. This leads the two constraints
(IC0 ) and (IC1) to be slack, implying again that there exists δ′ < δ∗ such that the system still
holds true when δ = δ′. It follows from (i) and (ii) that both constraints must be binding.
This ﬁrst result establishes that, when aP = a∗P , and δ = δ
∗, the two incentive constraints are
exactly satisﬁed. Therefore we may compute a∗P and δ
∗ by solving in (aP , δ) the system (IC0 -IC1)
with equality signs.
To compare, recall that Abreu (1986)’s problem consists in identifying the pair of actions
(aP , aC) that permits ﬁrms to maintain the most proﬁtable collusive action aC for a given discount
factor δ. The two approaches are dual since the value δ∗ we obtain as a solution, for a given am,
is identical to the given value of δ that leads to the solution a∗C = am in Abreu’s problem. In the
latter, the solution a∗C is bounded from above by the stage-game joint-proﬁt maximizing action.
When δ is high enough for this boundary value to be implemented as a collusive equilibrium, the
constraint not to deviate from collusion is slack. This explains why Lemma 1 diﬀers slightly from
Abreu’s Theorem 15, in which the analogue of (IC0 ) holds with a weak inequality only (while
the analogue to (IC1) holds with an equality sign, as in the present case).
Note however that the single-period punishment action that implements the collusive action
needs not be a∗P . This is because a
∗
P is deﬁned as the punishment action that satisﬁes (IC0 -
IC1) for the lowest possible value of δ, that is exactly δ∗. When δ > δ∗, the collusive action is
implementable with a “non-optimal punishment” aP about a∗P .
We now introduce two additional constraints. The ﬁrst one is a participation constraint.10 It
speciﬁes that each ﬁrm, when it actualizes the future stream of proﬁts earned from the period
of punishment onward, must ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to continue playing the game even if it earned
negative proﬁts for a while. Formally, it must be the case that π(aP )+
∞
k=1 δ
kπm ≥ 0. A simple
reorganization of terms, toward a more intuitive expression, leads to
(1− δ) [πm − π(aP )] ≤ πm. (PC )
In words, the participation constraint is satisﬁed when the proﬁt a ﬁrm forgoes in the pun-
ishment period, that is the diﬀerence πm − π(aP ), is not greater than the discounted stream of
collusive proﬁts earned in all following periods, that is πm/ (1− δ).
10Lambson (1987) refers to it as an individual rationality constraint.
11
Note that (IC1), which we may rewrite as (1− δ) [πm − π(aP )] ≤ πm− πdi (aP ), can be easily
compared to (PC ). Recalling from (A5) that πdi (aP ) ≤ (>)0 if and only if aP  (≻)a˜P , observe
that (IC1) is (weakly) stronger than (PC ) if and only if aP  a˜P . It follows that, when a∗P ≺ a˜P ,
(PC ) is violated, hence δ∗ is not attainable.
In this case, toward a solution to the participation-constrained problem we deﬁne a particular
punishment action, denoted by aP , that satisﬁes exactly both (IC0) and (PC ). In formal terms,
π (aP ) = πm − πdi (am).11 For notational clarity, let π ≡ π (aP ). Note that aP ≺ aNE because
π (aP ) < 0.
The next constraint is central to the analysis. It imposes a limit to the severity of the
punishments all ﬁrms may inﬂict on each other in a single period. Formally, aP must satisfy
π(aP ) ≥ π. (LLC )
This constraint can be rooted in structural conditions (e.g., demand is ﬁnite at any price, including
zero), ﬁnancial considerations (e.g., a proﬁtability target), or in institutional features (e.g., a
regulation). In what follows we refer to this weak inequality as the limited liability constraint. It
does not appear in Abreu (1986)’s seminal paper, where the inverse demand is strictly monotonic,
and the constant marginal cost is always positive, so that losses can be made as negative as needed
by charging suﬃciently close to zero. In the majority of more recent models which capitalize
on Abreu’s results, and specify a stick-and-carrot mechanism with a single punishment period, a
limited liability constraint is implicit (e.g., the quantity demanded is ﬁnite for all prices, including
zero), although to the best of our knowledge its implications were not investigated in the literature.
Note from (IC0) that the ﬁrst incentive constraint is satisﬁed if and only if

πdi (am)− πm

/δ ≤
πm−π(aP ), and from (LLC ) that the limited liability constraint can be rewritten πm− π(aP ) ≤
πm − π. It follows that, for a given collusive “target” am to be implementable, we must have
πdi (am)− πm

/δ ≤ πm − π for some δ ∈ (0, 1]. The latter condition obviously does not hold if
limδ→1

πdi (am)− πm

/δ > πm − π, or equivalently if π > πm −

πdi (am)− πm

. Accordingly,
the limited liability constraint can be so strong as to make collusion impossible. Because we
assume that π ≤ π (aNE), a feasibility condition for am to be implementable in this single-period
punishment context is πm − π (aNE) ≥ πdi (am)− πm. In words, the one-shot proﬁt of collusion
must be greater than the gain to deviating from it.
11The implicit deﬁnition of aP is obtained by rewriting (IC1) as δ ≥

πdi (am)− πm

/ [πm − π (aP )], and (PC)
as δ ≥ −π (aP ) / [πm − π (aP )]. Then observe that the denominators are equal. If a
∗
P ≺ a˜P , we know that
aP exists. This is because πdi (am) − πm = π
d
i (a
∗
P ) − π (a
∗
P ) from Lemma 1, and π
d
i (a
∗
P ) < 0 from (A5), hence
π (a∗P ) < πm−π
d
i (am) < 0. Recalling that π (aNE) ≥ 0, by the intermediate value theorem we have a
∗
P ≺ aP ≺ aNE
such that π (aP ) = πm − πdi (am).
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The order relation on the set of punishment actions aP , as deﬁned in the previous section,
implies that (LLC ) can be rewritten as aP  aP . This does not mean that punishments cannot
result in very low proﬁts when (LLC ) is satisﬁed. Indeed recall from (A5) that the “lower” bound
aP , when played by all ﬁrms in N\{i}, can be suﬃciently severe as to make ﬁrm i stop producing
as a best-reply.
We may now write the δ-minimization problem in aP as follows:
min
aP∈A
δ
s.t. IC0; IC1;PC ;LLC
(1)
The lowest δ for which the collusive action am is implementable ﬁnds diﬀerent expressions
depending on the comparison of the structurally deﬁned punishment actions a∗P , aP , and aP .
Proposition 1. The collusive action am  a∗m is implementable with a single-period punishment
if and only if δ ≥ δ∗1, with
δ∗1 =

δ∗ ≡ πdi (am)−πm
πm−π(a∗P )
if a∗P  aP , aP (regime 1);
δ ≡ πdi (am)−πm
πm−π if aP  aP , a∗P (regime 2);
δ ≡ πdi (am)−πm
πm−π if aP  a∗P , aP (regime 3);
(2)
with δ∗ < 1 and δ < 1 for all parameter values, and δ < (=) 1 if and only if π < (=)πm −
πdi (am)− πm

.
Proof. First we solve a less constrained version of (1), in which (PC ) and (LLC ) are absent.
Then we reintroduce each of the latter two constraints separately. (See appendix A.1.)
The three regimes identiﬁed in Proposition 1 reﬂect which constraints are at play in the δ-
minimization problem (1). In regime 1, the two incentive constraints are stronger than (PC ) and
(LLC ). The optimal punishment is a∗P , and the minimized discount factor is δ
∗
1 = δ
∗ (here the
subscript “1” refers to the single-period punishment case). In regime 2, (IC0) and (PC ) bite,
the optimal punishment is aP , and am can be implemented only if δ ≥ δ∗1 = δ; while in regime 3,
(IC0) and (LLC ) are binding, the optimal punishment is aP , and am can be implemented only
if δ ≥ δ∗1 = δ. Note that (IC0) is active in all regimes. In fact a ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate from
the collusive action remains the same in the three regimes.
Another important point is that the comparison between regimes 1 and 2 diﬀers in kind from
the comparison between regime 3 and either regime 1 or 2. More precisely, whether a solution is
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of the regime-1 or regime-2 type depends on whether (PC ) is stronger than (IC1) or not. Their
ranking is rooted in the ﬁrms’ payoﬀ functions. Whether regime 3 arises or not can also depend
on the strategy set, which can be limited “from below” for all sorts of institutional or ﬁnancial
reasons that do not relate to cost or demand conditions.
Remark 1. If a∗P  aP , aP , so that regime 1 applies, δ∗ ≥ δ, δ.
This remark emphasizes a subtle aspect of Proposition 1. Obviously, when either regime 2
or 3 applies, so that either (PC ) or (LLC ) binds, respectively, we have δ∗ ≤ δ, δ. Indeed the
δ-minimization problem (1) is more constrained than when only the incentive constraints (IC0)
and (IC1) are considered. However, when regime 1 applies, it does not mean that (PC ) and
(LLC ) are set aside. It only means that (IC0) and (IC1) are stronger than both (PC ) and
(LLC ). Hence the relevant threshold δ∗ cannot be lower than δ and δ. More generally, in the
single-period punishment benchmark problem, at most two constraints bind, that determine the
threshold for δ. This threshold can only be higher than the other two expressions in (2).
A ﬁnal observation is that, while δ∗ and δ are both lower than 1, the limited liability constraint
can be so strong as to result in δ > 1, in which case the collusive action am is not implementable
with a single-period scheme, for any δ. Recalling that our objective is to identify the largest space
of parameters for which a given collusive action is implementable, it remains to investigate the
possibility to lengthen the duration of the punishment phase. The intuition is that, by shifting
to a multi-period punishment scheme, ﬁrms can penalize more severely a deviation than in the
single-period framework. This can soften the lower bound condition on the discount factor, and
thus facilitate collusion.12 However, we demonstrate in the next section that this occurs only is
very speciﬁc circumstances, we fully characterize.
4 The Main Results
In this section we introduce the possibility for ﬁrms to choose a punishment action over several
periods. The objective is to investigate the impact of the extended length of punishment on ﬁrms’
ability to implement collusion, when the severity of punishment is limited in each period.
12Several periods of punishment have been considered only in a few theoretical contributions with more speciﬁc
assumptions than in the present model. Lambson (1987) considers price-setting sellers of a homogenous good,
a constant average cost, with capacity constraints. Häckner (1996) constructs a repeated price-setting duopoly
model, with spatial diﬀerentiation, and a constant average cost normalized to zero. In Lambertini and Sasaki
(2002), again there are two ﬁrms and a constant marginal average cost, but with another speciﬁcation of the
horizontal diﬀerentiation assumption, together with a non-negative constraint on quantities, but not on prices.
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To do that, consider a stick-and-carrot penal code in which, if any deviation from am by
any ﬁrm is detected, all ﬁrms switch to a l-period punishment phase (the stick) during which
they play aP,k, with k = 1, . . . , l. Punishment actions may vary from one period to another. A
deviation from the punishment action may occur in any period of punishment. If this occurs, the
punishment phase restarts for l more periods, after which all ﬁrms revert to the initial collusive
action am forever (the carrot).
Formally, the two incentive constraints (IC0) and (IC1) are now extended to
πdi (am) +
l
k=1
δkπ(aP,k) +
∞
k=l+1
δkπm ≤
∞
k=0
δkπm, (3)
and
πdi (aP,s) +
l
k=1
δkπ (aP,k) +
∞
k=l+1
δkπm ≤
l
k=s
δk−sπ(aP,k) +
∞
k=l+1
δk−sπm, (4)
respectively, for any period s in which a ﬁrm deviates from the penal code, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l, all i.
Given am, the vector aP ≡ (aP,1, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l) sustains collusion if and only if (3) and
(4) are satisﬁed. There are 1+ l incentive constraints in all: the single constraint in (3) says that
the gain earned by deviating from the collusive action must be smaller than what is lost over
the l periods of punishment; the other l constraints in (4) say that the gain to deviate from the
punishment phase, in any period s, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l, must be smaller than the loss incurred by
re-initiating the punishment phase.
To simplify the presentation of incentive constraints and clarify their interpretation, we now
introduce a value function. If a ﬁrm does not deviate from the punishment path, the continuation
proﬁts it earns from period s+ 1 onward is
Vs (aP , δ) =
l
k=s+1
δk−s−1π(aP,k) +
∞
k=l+1
δk−s−1πm. (5)
Here s = 0 indicates that the l-period ﬂow of punishment proﬁts is not truncated from below,
whereas s = l means that exactly all punishment proﬁts are removed, so that only collusive proﬁts
are considered from period l + 1 onward. Note from (5) that aP,l+1 = am implies Vs (aP , δ) ≤
Vl (aP , δ) = πm/ (1− δ), all s. This also implies that Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ).
Then the multi-period incentive constraints in (3) and (4) are
πdi (am)− πm ≤ δ [V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC 0)
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and
πdi (aP,1)− π (aP,1) ≤ δ [V1 (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC 1)
. . . (...)
πdi (aP,s)− π(aP,s) ≤ δ [Vs (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC s)
. . . (...)
πdi (aP,l)− π(aP,l) ≤ δ [Vl (aP , δ)− V0 (aP , δ)] , (MIC l)
respectively, with 1 ≤ s ≤ l. Note that π(aP,s) ≤ πdi (aP,s) requires that V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Vs (aP , δ),
all s, a feasibility condition of the punishment scheme.
In (MIC 0) we compare a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ when it colludes by choosing am, that is πm+δV0 (am, δ),
with the payoﬀ it earns by deviating, that is πdi (am) + δV0 (aP , δ). It is individually rational to
stick to the collusive action if this ﬁrst constraint is satisﬁed. The next incentive constraints,
one for each period of punishment, compare a ﬁrm’s payoﬀ when it implements a punishment
action, with the payoﬀ it earns by deviating. More precisely, in (MIC 1) we compare the ﬁrm’s
payoﬀ when it plays aP,1, that is π (aP,1) + δV1 (aP , δ), with the payoﬀs it earns by deviating,
that is πdi (aP,1)+ δV0 (aP , δ). The next row describes the same comparison for the next period of
punishment, and so on, down to (MIC l). A ﬁrm will not deviate from the l-period punishment
path if all constraints of rank s = 1, . . . , l are satisﬁed.
A ﬁrst technical claim is a multi-period counterpart to Lemma 1, as oﬀered above in the
single-period punishment case.
Lemma 2. Given aP,1, the lowest discount factor δ verifying (MIC 0) and (MIC 1) results from
punishment actions aP,k, with k > 1, such that these two multi-period incentive constraints bind.
Proof. See appendix, section A.2.
The multi-period participation constraint is Vs (aP , δ) ≥ 0, all s = 0, 1, . . . , l. In words, the
continuation proﬁts, from the ﬁrst period of punishment onward, must remain non-negative for a
ﬁrm to implement the punishment aP . Interestingly this can also be rewritten as
(1− δ) [V0 (am, δ)− Vs (aP , δ)] ≤ πm, (MPC )
all s = 0, 1, . . . , l, an intuitive generalization of the single-punishment period counterpart in
(PC ). This says that the sum of proﬁts that each ﬁrm foregoes by implementing the remaining
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punishment as+1, . . . , al, that is the diﬀerence V0 (am, δ) − Vs (aP , δ), cannot be more than the
discounted stream of proﬁts earned in all collusive periods that follow, πm/ (1− δ).13
Observe from (MIC 0) and (MPC ) that the value diﬀerential V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ) is bounded
from below by

πdi (am)− πm

/δ and from above by πm/ (1− δ), respectively. This yields:
Lemma 3. The lowest δ compatible with (MIC 0) and (MPC ) is δ ≡ πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)
.
Proof. The threshold δ =

πdi (am)− πm

/πdi (am) follows directly from the comparison of
(MIC 0) and (MPC ) for s = 0. This threshold does not diﬀer from δ, as introduced in Proposition
1, since πdi (am) = πm − π (denominator) from the implicit deﬁnition of aP .
Therefore there can be no l-period punishment aP that implements am when the discount
factor is strictly lower than δ. In other words, the lengthening of the punishment scheme cannot
help relaxing the participation constraint.
Now the multi-period limited liability constraint is
π(aP,k) ≥ π, (MLLC )
with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, all l ≥ 2. In words, the limited liability constraint (MLLC ) captures structural
conditions imposing that, in any period k of the punishment phase, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt cannot be
driven below π, a parameter. Note that (MLLC ) implies that aP,1  aP , which we use to prove
the following technical result:
Lemma 4. The lowest δ compatible with (MIC 0) and (MLLC ) is δ′ ≡ πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aP )
.
Proof. First, recall from Lemma 2 that, given aP,1, the lowest discount factor δ verifying (MIC 0)
and (MIC 1) results from punishment actions aP,k, with k > 1, such that both (MIC 0) and
(MIC 1) bind. This implies that the latter two constraints must hold with an equality sign
throughout. The solution in (δ, V1) is (δ
∗(aP,1),V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1))), with
δ∗(aP,1) =
πdi (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi (aP,1)
,
where the monotonicity of πdi (aP,1) in aP,1 (see Lemma A-2 in the appendix, section A.2) implies
that δ∗(aP,1) is monotone non-decreasing in aP,1. Next, introduce the constraint (MLLC ), which
is equivalent to aP,1  aP . Then substitute aP for aP,1 to ﬁnd δ∗(aP ) = δ′.
13The latter interpretation of (MPC ) is even more intuitive when one sees that V0 (aM , δ) − V0 (aP , δ) =l
k=1 δ
k−1 (π(aM )− π(aP,k)), so that l = 1 leads to (PC ), the participation constraint in the single-period punish-
ment setup.
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Given all constraints, the multi-period punishment problem is
min
(aP,1,...,aP,l)∈Al
δ
s.t. (MIC 0−MIC l);MPC ;MLLC
(7)
For any given l, the optimal multi-period punishment is the solution in aP = (aP,1, . . . , aP,l) to
(7). It yields the lowest possible value of the discount factor, we denote by δ∗l , that authorizes
ﬁrms to implement am, under all constraints. In what follows we examine successively the role of
the 1+ l multi-period incentive constraints (MIC 0-MIC l), the participation constraint (MPC ),
and the limited liability constraint (MLLC ).
We now establish that, in the absence of participation and limited liability constraints, or
when they are slack, the possibility to punish over several periods does not result in an optimal
punishment path that diﬀers from the single-period punishment case, our benchmark.
Proposition 2. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if a∗P  aP , aP the collusive action
am  a∗m is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ∗, and a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Proof. There are two steps (see appendix): (1) We investigate a less constrained version of
(7) by leaving aside the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints together with (MPC ) and
(MLLC ), to keep only (MIC 0) and (MIC 1). This is done by capitalizing on Lemma 2: we solve
in (δ, V1) the system (MIC 0-MIC 1) with equality signs, to obtain (δ
∗(aP,1), V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1)));
then we identify the level of aP,1 that minimizes δ
∗(aP,1) under the feasibility constraint that
V1(aP , δ
∗(aP,1)) ≤ Vl (aP , δ∗(aP,1)) = πm/ (1− δ∗(aP,1)). This leads to the minimizer a∗P,1 = a∗P .
(2) We show that (δ∗(a∗P ), V1(aP , δ
∗(a∗P ))) satisﬁes all incentive constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) as
well as (MPC -MLLC ).
Obviously it is always possible to replicate the single-period punishment scheme by playing
aP,1 = aP in the ﬁrst period, followed in all l−1 subsequent periods by the same collusive action,
that is aP,k = am, all k = 2, . . . , l. Proposition 2 establishes that, when (MPC ) and (MLLC ) are
slack, by doing so with aP = a∗P one obtains the lowest possible value of δ for which the collusive
action am is implementable. The threshold value of the discount factor we obtain in this l-period
punishment scheme is the same as in the single-punishment case, namely δ∗.
Remark 2. If a∗P  aP , aP there is a unique punishment path a∗P that permits ﬁrms to implement
am for δ = δ
∗.
In other words, as long as the participation and limited liability constraints are not binding,
there is one best way to solve (7). In a supergame with discounting, late punishments have less
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impact. Firms must charge a low price or supply a large quantity as early as possible, that is in the
ﬁrst punishment period, in order to minimize the discount factor at which am is implementable.
Next, we establish that, when the multi-period participation constraint binds, again the pos-
sibility to punish over several periods does not enlarge the space of parameters for which the
collusive action is implementable.
Proposition 3. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP  aP , a∗P , the collusive action
am  a∗m is implementable if and only if δ ≥ δ, and aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal.
Proof. There are two steps (see the appendix, section A.2): (1) In addition to (MIC 0) and
(MIC 1), we introduce (MPC ) in the less constrained version of (7), the last l − 1 multi-period
incentive constraints and (MLLC ) being left aside. We show that (MPC ) is stronger than (IC1)
if a∗P  a˜P . Then am is implementable with the l-period punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) if
δ = δ, that is the lower bound to the interval of δ for which (MIC 0) and (MPC ) are compatible.
(2) We obtain that (δ,aP ) satisﬁes all other incentive constraints (MIC 2-MIC l), in which case
δ is a solution of (7) and aP is optimal.
When (MPC ) binds, by playing aP in the ﬁrst punishment period (as in the single-period
scheme), followed by the same collusive action afterwards (i.e., aP,k = am, all k = 2, . . . , l), one
obtains the lowest possible value of δ for which am is implementable. This discount threshold is the
same as in the single-punishment case when (PC ) binds, that is δ. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. Indeed the participation constraint V0 (aP , δ) ≥ 0 determines the maximum total
punishment a ﬁrm can incur (as opposed to a per-period punishment). In fact this constraint
is identical in the single- and multi-period schemes, since the deﬁnition of the maximum total
punishment does not depend on the number of periods. When the participation constraint binds
with only one punishment period, it cannot be relaxed by extending the number of periods.
Remark 3. If aP ≻ a∗P there is a continuum of punishments that permit ﬁrms to implement am
for δ = δ.
This says that, when (MPC ) binds, the punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) is only one way,
among others, of implementing am when the discount factor is the lowest possible, at δ. Firms
may opt for a softer ﬁrst-period action if they choose to lengthen the punishment phase to one or
several subsequent periods, before reverting to am. While the possibility to punish over several
periods does not permit ﬁrms to reduce the discount factor threshold for which the collusive action
is implementable, the space of punishment strategies that allow them to reach a given threshold
is strictly larger than in the single-period punishment case.
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We now turn to the case of a binding limited liability constraint. We will see that it diﬀers
qualitatively from the previous cases, in that additional punishment periods result in a strictly
lower discount threshold than with a single-period scheme.
The next proposition describes the optimal punishment, and characterizes the associated
discount threshold, when (MLLC ) binds.
Proposition 4. In the multi-period punishment scheme, if aP  a∗P , aP collusion at am  a∗m is
implementable if and only if δ ≥ δM ≡ sup{δ, δ′}, with aP ≡ (aP , aP,2, . . . , aP,l) of ﬁnite length l.
Proof. As we are interested in establishing implementability for δ ≥ δM ≡ sup{δ, δ′}, there are
two cases that depend on the comparison of δ′ and δ (see the appendix, section A.2). In both
cases: (1) we establish that there exists a ﬁnite punishment, we denote aP , which is such that
V1 (aP , δ) is equal to a particular value we explicit; (2) we check that all incentive constraints are
satisﬁed; (3) we also verify that the participation and limited liability constraints hold.
Remark 4. If (MLLC ) is strictly binding, that is if aP ≻ a∗P , aP , there exits a continuum of
optimal punishments (aP , a2, . . . , al) of ﬁnite length l ≥ 2, such that am is implementable for
δ = δM .
In other words, when the limited liability constraint binds, so that the single period punish-
ment action aP,1 cannot be more severe than aP , the multi-period optimal punishment proﬁle
does not necessarily look like the usual front-loading scheme (where ﬁrms are punished as much
as immediately possible before returning to the collusive path as soon as possible). In fact the
optimal proﬁle (aP , a2, . . . , al) can display much more complicated patterns.
Example 1. Two price-setting ﬁrms sell a homogeneous good in a market with a linear demand.
Sales from ﬁrm i are given by
qi(p) =

q(pi) if pi < pj
1
2q(pi) if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
,
where q(pi) = sup{0, α − pi} for α > 0 and pi ≥ 0, with i, j = 1, 2, i = j. The unit cost of
production is a constant c > 0, the ﬁxed cost is f > 0, and there is a price-ﬂoor regulation which
prohibits below-marginal-cost pricing, i.e. p
P
= pNE = c, so that the limited liability constraint
is π(pP,k) ≥ π = −f , with 1 ≤ k ≤ l, all l ≥ 2. The punishment proﬁle aP possibly can take
the form of a price asymmetric cycle, where fast price increases from c to the (perfect) collusive
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price p∗m = (α+ c) /2 are followed by several smaller decreases down to the price ﬂoor, or the
neighborhood of it (see Figure 1).
Example 1 echoes recent empirical investigations on dynamic pricing behavior in retail gasoline
markets, where asymmetric retail price cycles are observed. They begin with a price jump, followed
by a series of smaller price cuts, until the observed price reaches the competitive level (Eckert
(2002), Eckert and West (2004); Noel (2006, 2007)). Then the cycle restarts, and so on. This
resembles the Edgeworth cycles obtained as a (non-collusive) equilibrium in an alternating-move
price-setting duopoly model by Maskin and Tirole (1988). Here Figure 1 illustrates that two-phase
asymmetric cycles are also consistent with collusion as implemented by a multi-period punishment
scheme.14
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Figure 1: The punishment proﬁle p
P
≡ (p
P
, pP,2, . . . , pP,l) in Example 1 can take the form of asymmetric
price cycles (here with α = 1, c = 1/4, p
P
= pNE= c = 1/4, implying that δM≡ sup {δ′,δ} = 1/2). In this
ten-period punishment phase, fast price increases from p
P
to p∗m= (α+ c)/2 are followed by a two-period fall
down to p
P
= c (here with intermediate prices aP,3= aP,6= aP,9= (pP+p
∗
m)/2).
We may now state our main proposition. It synthesizes the previous results, and allows us to
rank all the discount thresholds introduced above.
14The limited liability constraint in Example 1 echoes the regulations that constrain the formation of gasoline
retail prices above the wholesale (rack) price in several U.S. states and Canadian provinces (Houde 2008, 2010). In
our setup there can be no deviation from the collusive path in equilibrium. However, should uncertainty of some
kind be introduced, out-of-equilibrium punishment proﬁles would be observed (for example, unobserved random
shocks on demand may induce price wars to appear in equilibrium, as ﬁrst investigated in Porter (1983) and Green
and Porter (1984)).
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Proposition 5. If aP ≻ a∗P , aP , and additional punishment periods are introduced, the lowest
discount factor δM that permits the implementation of am  a∗m cannot be as low as δ∗, and can
attain δ only in particular circumstances. More formally, either aP  a∗P so that δ∗ < δM < δ,
or aP ≻ a∗P and δ ≤ δM < δ. In the latter case δM = δ if and only if a˜P  aP ≻ aP ≻ a∗P .
Proof. See the appendix, section A.2.
In other words, when regime 3 applies in the single-period scheme, a delayed punishment with
discounting oﬀers only an imperfect substitute for more immediate severity.
To see that, suppose that, absent the (multi-period) limited liability constraint (MLLC ),
regime 1 applies. Then recall from Remark 2 that the only punishment proﬁle allowing ﬁrms
to implement collusion when δ = δ∗, a lower bound, is a∗P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am). When limited
liability results in regime 3 to apply, we know that a∗P is unattainable in the ﬁrst punishment
period. In that case a longer punishment phase permits ﬁrms to increase the total punishment,
and thereby facilitates collusion in that it results in a discount threshold δM which is lower than
δ. However, with discounting, delayed punishments harm less. They do not allow δM to attain
the lower bound δ∗.
As an alternative, suppose now that, absent the limited liability constraint, regime 2 applies.
In that case, recalling that aP is implicitly deﬁned by π = πm − πdi (am), it is straightforward
to observe from the comparison of the expressions of δ and δ′, as displayed in Proposition 3 and
Lemma 4 respectively, that the two thresholds coincide if and only if πdi (aP ) = 0, or equivalently
aP = a˜P . When punishments cannot be very severe, in that aP ≻ a˜P , ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts
by deviating from the punishment “ﬂoor” (i.e., πdi (aP ) > 0, see Assumption A6). In that case
there is no ﬁnite number of punishment periods that allow ﬁrms to implement am for a discount
level as low as δ. That is, δM > δ. Only when the most severe punishment is such that ﬁrms
cannot break even by deviating, so that their minmax proﬁt is non-positive (i.e., πdi (aP ) ≤ 0),
they may implement am by lengthening the punishment phase for any discount level greater than
or equal to δ, that is δM = δ.
By substituting (aP , am, . . . , am) for aP in (MIC 1), and reorganizing terms, we obtain that
πdi (aP ) ≤ πm for all aP  am. This leads to:
Remark 5. δM ≤ 1.
In other words, the Folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) is veriﬁed in the multi-
period punishment setup (recall from Proposition 1 that, with a single period of punishment, in
Regime 3 we have δ > 1 for π suﬃciently high).
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The next section illustrates the latter results and their interpretation in the usual context of
a linear case.
5 A Linear Case
In this section, we introduce additional speciﬁcations on costs and demand in order to illustrate the
importance of considering limited liability constraints in the familiar context of a linear oligopoly
structure. We investigate the circumstances which allow ﬁrms to sustain perfect collusion (i.e., to
maximize joint proﬁts) when prices cannot be negative. Toward this aim, we assume that, over
all periods, demand is derived from a utility function adapted from Häckner (2000), of the form
U(q, I) =
n
i=1
qi − 1
2
 n
i=1
q2i + 2γ

i=j
qiqj
+ I, (8)
which is quadratic in the consumption of q-products and linear in the consumption of the com-
posite I-good (the numeraire).15 The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) measures product substitutability as
perceived by consumers. If γ → 0, the demand for the diﬀerent product varieties are independent
and each ﬁrm has monopolistic market power, while if γ → 1, the products are perfect substitutes.
Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint

piqi + I ≤ m, where m denotes
income, pi is the non-negative price of product i, and the price of the composite good I is normal-
ized to one. By symmetry, we note

j =i qj = (n− 1)qj . On the cost side, in the example we set
f = 0, for simplicity, and a constant marginal cost c < 1. We examine the Cournot version of the
model. With quantity-setting ﬁrms, the relation q′ is more severe than q is formally equivalent
to q′ ≥ q.
From (8) ﬁrm i’s inverse demand function in each period is
pi(qi, qj) = sup{0, 1− qi − γ(n− 1)qj}, (9)
and the inverse demand for each other symmetric ﬁrm j in N\{i} is
pj(qi, qj) = sup {0, 1− γqi − (1 + γ(n− 2))qj} , (10)
all qi, qj ≥ 0, i = j. It is straightforward to check that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is continuous and
the associated maximization problem is convex.
15 In Häckner (2000), quantities qi are multiplied by a parameter ai, that is a measure of the distinctive quality
of each variety i. Here we exclude vertical product diﬀerentiation by assuming that ai = 1, all i ∈ N .
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Which of the three regimes we identiﬁed in Proposition 1 applies depends on the status of
the participation and limited liability constraints. This in turn depends on the number of ﬁrms
n, the degree of product diﬀerentiation γ, and the marginal (and unit) cost c. The connection of
the latter cost parameter to the limited liability constraint, is very intuitive in this example.
With a linear demand, the quantity demanded is ﬁnite at all prices. The limited liability
constraint here does not artiﬁcially set boundaries to ﬁrms’ strategies, as it only formalizes that
prices cannot be negative:
π(aP,k) ≥ π ≡ π(qP ),
where the most severe punishment q
P
is obtained when the price charged by all ﬁrms is equal to
zero. This may result in exactly zero proﬁts if the marginal cost is equal to zero as well, or to losses
if the price-cost margin is negative, all other things (i.e., the demand to each ﬁrm) remaining
equal. Whether the endogenous q∗P or qP , as deﬁned above (by simply substituting q for a) is less
or more severe than q
P
can thus be seen to depend only on the comparison of c with a threshold
level, we denote by c, which is a function of n and γ.
In the speciﬁc algebraic context of this example, we check that (PC ) binds if and only if
qP ≥ q˜P , where q˜P = (1− c) / [γ (n− 1)] is computed by solving πd(q) = 0 (see Assumption (A5)).
Note that, in the absence of ﬁxed costs, we have q˜P = qˆP (see Assumption (A6)), and deviation
proﬁts cannot be negative (a ﬁrm may stop producing to earn zero beneﬁt). Moreover (LLC )
binds if and only if qP ≥ qP , where qP = 1/ [1 + γ(n− 1)] is obtained by solving pi(q, q) = 0. This
is because, in the absence of regulatory intervention, the lower bound to punishment proﬁts results
from the non-negativity constraint in prices (the constraint binds when quantities are suﬃciently
large, because demand is ﬁnite).
We can compute the expression of the frontier c˜ (for the speciﬁc form see appendix A.3.1),
a function of n and γ, which delineates the parameter space in which the quantity q∗m (perfect
collusion) can be implemented in the benchmark set-up with a single-period punishment scheme.16
If c < c˜, collusion cannot be sustained, for any set of parameter values, with a single-period
punishment scheme. However, we verify that collusion at q∗m can always be implemented with a
multi-period punishment scheme for some δ in [δM , 1], which illustrates the Folk theorem in this
linear setup. We also compute the three-part expression of a continuous frontier c, with c = 0
if 0 ≤ γ ≤ γˆ, c = c′ > 0 if γˆ < γ ≤ γˇ, and c = c′′ > c′ otherwise, with γˆ ≡ 2/ (n− 1) and
16With a multi-period punishment scheme, the collusive quantity q∗m is always implementable by mimicking a
trigger mechanism (with qP = qNE, the Cournot equilibrium quantity, forever). In that case collusion is sustainable
for all δ ≥ π
d
i
(q∗
m
)−π∗
m
πd
i
(q∗
m
)−π(qNE)
. The latter discount threshold is always less than 1.
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γˇ ≡ 2 1 +√2 / (n− 1), all n. This leads to a partition of the parameter space (n, γ, c) into
three subsets, one for each regime.
1=c
0 1=γ
PP
qqc =′′ :
regime 2:
∗≤ PPP qqq ,regime 1:
PPP
qqq ,≤∗
γγ ˆ=
PP
qqc =′ ∗:
PP
qq =~
γγ (=
PP qq =
∗
c~
PPP
qqq ,∗≤
regime 3:
Figure 2: Collusion regimes in plane (c, γ) for n ≥ 6. The limited liability constraint binds in the grey area
(regime 3). In the benchmark single-period set-up, the collusive quantity is not implementable below the frontier c˜.
Proposition 6. The parameter space (c, n, γ) is partitioned in three subsets where either Regime
1, 2, or 3, as deﬁned in (2), applies.
Proof. See appendix A.3.3.
The partition of the parameter space (c, n, γ) is such that, if the constant unit cost is
suﬃciently high (formally, c ≥ c), either regime 1, where neither (PC ) nor (LLC ) binds, or
regime 2, where (PC ) binds, applies. The former case may hold for all n ≥ 2, while the second
cannot arise if n < 6. Regime 3 is ruled out only if n = 2. Otherwise, when goods are suﬃciently
substitutable (γ ≥ γˆ), and for all numbers of ﬁrms, a suﬃciently large reduction in c will always
result in a shift to regime 3, where (LLC ) binds.17
17To the best of our knowledge this characterization cannot be found in the literature. However, a clear intuition
for that result already appears in an exploratory note by Lambertini and Sasaki (2001), who explain that “high
marginal costs tend to provide more room for tacit collusion than [...] with lower marginal costs, due to the positive
price constraint” (p. 119).
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Fig. 2 precisely illustrates this point.18 Note that the non-implementability frontier c˜ is
monotone increasing in γ and crosses the plane (γ, c) below c′′. It is non-negative if and only if
γ ≥ γˇ. Because inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if and only if n < 6, the collusive q∗m cannot be implemented in
the single-period scheme for all n ≥ 6 if the marginal cost is suﬃciently low and/or the products
are suﬃciently substitutable.19 At any point (c, n, γ) where Regime 3 applies (the grey area),
q∗m is implementable for all δ ≥ δM . This illustrates Proposition 4. Next, as an illustration of
Proposition 5, the grey area can be partitioned into three subsets, which describe the consequences
of introducing a multi-period punishment scheme. For all points below the frontier c′′ and above
the frontier q˜P = qP (so that q˜P ≤ qP together with f = 0 imply πdi (qP ) = 0), we have δM = δ.
Then ﬁrms may implement q∗m for all δ ≥ δM = δ with a multi-period punishment. Second, in
the grey area below the frontier q˜P = qP (in which case q˜P > qP implies π
d
i (qP ) > 0) and for
γ ≥ γˇ, we have δM > δ. In that case ﬁrms cannot implement q∗m for a discount level as low as δ.
Eventually, for γ < γˇ and below c′, we have q
P
< q∗P ≤ qP , hence δ∗ < δM < δ. In other words,
the limited liability constraint binds, and several periods of punishment are only an imperfect
substitute for more severity in the ﬁrst period. The same ﬁgure also helps identifying the role of
ﬁxed costs. When f = 0, one can check that (IC1) simpliﬁes to the same expression as (PC ).
This does not hold whenever f > 0.20 In that case all incentive constraints, together with the
limited liability constraint, remain unchanged. The only diﬀerence is that the future stream of
proﬁts earned from the ﬁrst period of punishment onward is reduced by the magnitude of ﬁxed
costs, so that the participation constraint becomes stronger. Hence the parameter subset where
regime 2 applies expands. This has no impact on δ∗, δ, and δ.
An interesting aspect of Proposition 6 is that the limited liability constraint can be ignored
for all values of c and γ if there are exactly two or three ﬁrms (see Regime 1-(i)). In that case, the
results obtained in the literature on the implementation of collusion with a duopoly, homogenous
goods, and a cost set to zero, are robust. This does not apply when n > 3, as the limited liability
constraint binds for some values of the cost and diﬀerentiation parameters.
18 In this ﬁgure, γ < (=)γˇ is equivalent to q∗P < (=)q˜P (see appendix A.3.2). Hence it is also equivalent to
q∗P < (=)qP , from Lemma 4.
19 In appendix A.3.1 we show that πdi (qP ) < π
∗
m. If it were not true, from Lemma 4 we would have δ
′ > 1, in
which case collusion could not be sustained, even with a multi-period punishment. This could occur if a suﬃciently
high ﬂoor on pi or low capacity constraint on qi were added.
20 If f = 0 we have πdi (qP ) = −f = 0 for all qP ≥ q˜P = qˆP . In that case, the solution to the δ-minimization
problem in qP , under (IC0) and (IC1) only, is the same as the solution under (IC0) and (PC ). If f > 0 the
constraint (PC ) becomes stronger than (IC1) for all qP ≥ q˜P , with qˆP > q˜P (see assumptions (A5) and (A6)). We
may also assume that f < 0 to capture the existence of a proﬁtable outside option. In this case (PC ) is weaker
than with a non-negative ﬁxed cost.
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It is also of interest to compare Proposition 6 with Abreu (1986), where there is no limited
liability constraint. In that paper, the model is a Cournot oligopoly with a strictly positive
constant unit cost, homogenous goods, and a quantity demanded that tends to inﬁnity when the
price approaches zero. Then the collusive q∗m can be implemented with a one-period punishment
penal code, for all numbers of ﬁrms, provided that the discount factor δ is above a threshold δ∗.
If there are at most three ﬁrms, Proposition 6 extends Abreu’s result to our speciﬁc example for
any (c, γ). This is remarkable since our demand speciﬁcation is not a special case of Abreu’s class
of demand functions. However, with more than three ﬁrms, the values of c and/or γ must be
higher than a threshold for a single-period punishment scheme to implement collusion at δ = δ∗
or δ = δ.21
We can also characterize the eﬀect of a change in the marginal cost c, the diﬀerentiation
parameter γ, or the number of ﬁrms n, on the thresholds δ∗, δ, δ, and δM , as follows:
Proposition 7. High marginal costs facilitate collusion in that the limited liability constraint
plays no role only if c ≥ c, where c is monotone increasing in n,γ. Moreover: (i) δ∗ and δ are
monotone increasing in n and γ, and are independent of c; (ii) δ and δM are monotone increasing
in n and γ, and monotone decreasing in c.
Proof. Points (i) and (ii) follow from simple derivations of functional forms that appear in the
appendix, sections A.3.1 and A.3.2.
This proposition establishes that an increase in product diﬀerentiation, and a reduction in
the number of ﬁrms, facilitate collusion in two ways. Given δ, it enlarges the range of cost
parameters for which optimal collusion can be implemented. Given c, more diﬀerentiation and
less ﬁrms both lower the discount factor thresholds associated to the three diﬀerent regimes.
These ﬁndings extend existing results to situations in which there is a limited liability constraint,
and also emphasize that all factors enhancing the ﬁrms’ ability to punish — in that they relax the
limited liability constraint — facilitate collusion.
21This result contrasts even more sharply with trigger penal code models, in which one can easily check that the
sustainability of collusion is not directly connected to the level of marginal costs in the linear cost setup. The role
of costs, given n and γ, is illustrated graphically in the appendix by comparing the optimal punishment quantities
q∗P and qP with qP for any c deﬁned on [0, 1]. Both q
∗
P and qP are linear in the cost parameter and monotone
decreasing when c rises closer to 1. As for q
P
, it depends only on the number of competitors and on demand
parameters. It is monotone decreasing when either n or γ increases, but constant in c.
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6 Connections to the Literature
In this section, we discuss the robustness of theoretical results, as received from a selection of
related papers, to the introduction of a limited liability constraint.22
One stream of the theoretical literature on collusion has followed Friedman (1971) by con-
sidering trigger strategies, which call for reversion to the one-shot stage game Nash equilibrium
forever when a deviation from the collusive rule is detected in a previous period. A weakness
common to all models of collusion with trigger strategies is that they rule out the possibility
of modulating the level of punishments. More precisely, by assuming that when a deviation is
detected ﬁrms revert to the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot stage game forever, they arbitrarily
put an upper bound on the severity of punishments. In this particular context where the strategy
set is de facto truncated, the limited liability constraint plays no role. Indeed, by assumption
(LLC ) cannot bind whenever aP ≺ aNE . When the strategy set is not arbitrarily truncated,
collusion is facilitated, and the limited liability constraint does impact ﬁrms’ ability to sustain
collusion.
The analysis of the connection between structural conditions and collusion stability with a
stick-and-carrot mechanism à la Abreu — where the punishment strategy is more severe than Nash
reversion — has been extended to many aspects.23 A series of papers investigate the impact of
product diﬀerentiation and industry concentration on the sustainability of collusive agreements.
An example is Wernerfelt (1989), who ﬁnds that more product diﬀerentiation renders collusion
less sustainable when the number of quantity-setting oligopolists is relatively large.24 In a two-
ﬁrm model where the constant marginal cost is set equal to zero, Häckner (1996) establishes
instead that diﬀerentiation facilitates collusive agreements. It is also demonstrated that, when the
punishment price is constrained to be non-negative, a prolonged price war is an optimal collusive
22For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the factors that facilitate collusion, see Motta (2004).
23Here we focus on contributions with complete information on cost parameters. Another research stream focuses
on circumstances in which each ﬁrm receives a cost shock in each period of a repeated price-setting game with inﬁnite
horizon (notably Athey et al. (2001, 2004, 2008)). An important result is that, when marginal costs are private
information and may diﬀer across ﬁrms, and under simple and general assumptions, ex ante cartel payoﬀs are
maximized when ﬁrms charge the same collusive price and share the market equally, as in simpler models with
complete information and symmetric ﬁrms. Other contributions, which do not always allow for the possibility
of pricing below marginal costs, investigate the impact of changes in demand, with various speciﬁcations for the
dynamics of shocks (see, in particular, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), Bagwell
and Staiger (1997)). A “tuned” collusive price gets closer to the competitive level when demand is high.
24Although of interest, this ambiguous result is derived from demand assumptions (adapted from Deneckere,
1983, 1984) which are not standard (on this see Osterdal, 2003, pp. 54-55).
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strategy. Our paper extends the analysis to situations where below-cost pricing is possible and
reveals that costs impact ﬁrms’ ability to sustain collusion.
With two ﬁrms and constant marginal costs again, but with another speciﬁcation of the
horizontal diﬀerentiation assumption, Lambertini and Sasaki (2002) ﬁnd a qualitatively similar
relationship between product substitutability and collusion sustainability. This is obtained in a
setup where quantities are constrained to be non-negative although prices may fall below zero.
The example in section 5 extends this result to a linear setup with n ﬁrms, when the limited
liability constraint imposes prices to be non-negative.
Other papers, including Rothschild (1999) and Miklós-Thal (2011), focus on cost asymme-
tries. It is found that collusion is more diﬃcult to sustain when costs are asymmetric, and that
collusion sustainability depends on the diﬀerence between the marginal cost levels that character-
ize both the less and the most eﬃcient ﬁrms in the industry. Compte, Jenny, and Rey (2002) in
particular capitalize on early characterizations by Lambson (1987, 1994) of optimal punishments
— possibly over several periods — for a class of inﬁnitely repeated games with price-setting sellers
of a homogenous good. They examine the impact of the distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capacity
constraints on the ability to sustain collusion. When capacity constraints are weak, in that any
subset of ﬁrms can serve the entire market, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game yields zero
proﬁt. When aggregate capacity is limited vis-à-vis market size, it is shown that asymmetric
capacities make collusion more diﬃcult to sustain. With no ﬁxed cost and a constant marginal
cost normalized to zero, ﬁrms earn zero proﬁt when they are minmaxed. This holds also when
the price is set to zero. Hence, the limited liability constraint associated to price non-negativity
can never be binding. Our analysis reveals that another factor would be at play if the marginal
cost were speciﬁed to be positive. In that case, the limited liability constraint would depend on
each ﬁrm i’s capacity ki, with the lowest proﬁt equal to −cki < 0, and it could be binding.
In Vasconcelos (2005), quantity-setting ﬁrms have a diﬀerent share of the industry capital,
which determines their marginal costs. In a punishment period, the total industry output is
divided in proportion to capital endowments. The analysis focuses on maximum punishments.
They make a deviant ﬁrm earn its minmax payoﬀ, that is zero (there are no ﬁxed costs), from
the ﬁrst period of punishment onward. In the terms of our paper, this is equivalent to assuming
that the ﬁrms’ punishment quantities are such that the participation constraint binds. When
this holds, an important result is that a one-period punishment penal code exists, where the
collusive action leads to monopoly proﬁts (perfect collusion), if the discount factor is higher than
a threshold level that depends on the size of the largest ﬁrm. The introduction of our limited
liability constraint — which is a natural extension since demand is ﬁnite so that punishments are
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structurally limited from below — would lead to a higher threshold for some parameter values. By
choosing simple values for the cost and demand parameters, we ﬁnd that the above-mentioned
discount threshold remains unchanged only if the marginal cost parameter is suﬃciently high.
More speciﬁcally, by setting (say) ki = 1/n for each ﬁrm i’s capital share (so that symmetry
is restored) and a = b = 1 for the linear demand curve parameters in Vasconcelos’ model, one
obtains that qP ≤ qP if and only if c ≥ sup {0, c(δ)}, where qP is the quantity such that both
(IC0) and (PC ), as deﬁned in the present paper, are exactly satisﬁed, and q
P
is the quantity
that drives prices to zero.25 For c < sup {0, c(δ)}, the limited liability constraint binds, and a
one-period simple penal code is suboptimal.
7 Conclusion
We fully characterize the conditions under which a limited liability constraint reduces the ﬁrms’
ability to implement a given collusive action in a large class of oligopoly supergames where the
duration of punishments can be adjusted. The limited liability constraint is in fact present in all
circumstances where either structural conditions (demand and technology), ﬁnancial considera-
tions (a proﬁtability target), or institutional circumstances (a regulation) set a lower bound to
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The main theoretical lesson of the paper is that models of collusion, when they
do not take into account the limited liability constraint, exaggerate the sustainability of collusive
agreements. More speciﬁcally, when the limited liability constraint binds we show that an inﬁnity
of punishment paths permit ﬁrms to implement optimal collusion. We establish that the lowest
discount factor for which collusion is implementable is always reached with a punishment phase
of ﬁnite length although the duration of the punishment phase is not bounded. The discount
threshold is either the same or strictly higher than in the absence of a limited liability constraint,
implying that a longer punishment is an imperfect substitute for more immediate severity. As a
policy implication, all attempts that amount to limiting further the severity of punishments can
only hinder collusion. Depending on circumstances, this can take the form of a cost reduction,
tighter ﬁnancial constraints, or a more stringent control of below-cost pricing by the legislation.
A possible extension is thus to investigate the implications of our results for the design of a regu-
latory mechanism that makes the limited liability constraint stronger and thereby makes collusion
less likely. This is left for future research.
25With ki = 1/n and a = b = 1, the discount threshold of Proposition 2 in Vasconcelos (2005, p. 48) reduces to
3 (n+ 2)n/ (2n+ 1)2. With δ at the latter level, we obtain c(δ) = 1/n.
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A Appendix
A.1 Single-Period Punishments
Proof of Proposition 1.We ﬁrst introduce three intermediate results (Lemmas A-1 to A-3).
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Figure A-1: The optimal punishment action a∗P is such that πdi (a∗P )− π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)− πm, given am (here
with aP ≺ a
∗
P ≺ aP ≺ a˜). As in Abreu (1986) the diﬀerence π
d
i (aP )− π(aP ) is unbounded from above if the
limited liability constraint is removed.
Lemma A-1. Given am, the optimal punishment action a∗P is such that π
d
i (a
∗
P ) − π(a∗P ) =
πdi (am)− πm. Hence a∗P = aˇ as deﬁned in Assumption (A7).
Proof. The constraints in (IC0-IC1) can be rewritten as δ ≥ δ′ and δ ≥ δ′′, respectively, with
δ′ ≡ πdi (am)− πm / [πm − π(aP )] and δ′′ ≡ πdi (aP )− π(aP ) / [πm − π(aP )]. Lemma 1 implies
that
δ∗ = δ′

aP=a
∗
P
= δ′′

aP=a
∗
P
.
It is then suﬃcient to observe that the numerators of δ′ and δ′′ are identical to conclude that the
numerators πdi (am)− πm and πdi (aP )− π(aP ) are also equal if aP = a∗P .
Lemma A-1 oﬀers an implicit deﬁnition of a∗P and says that, in the stage game, a ﬁrm’s
incentive to deviate from a∗P is equal to the incentive to deviate from am (see Fig. A-1). Note
that, because a∗P = aˇ from Lemma A-1, where aˇ is as in Assumption (A7), by continuity of
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πdi (.)− π(.), together with πdi (aNE)− π (aNE) = 0, the incentive to deviate from am is an upper
bound to a ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate, for any a that veriﬁes a∗P  a  am.
The next technical result establishes a monotonicity property.
Lemma A-2. πdi (a) ≥ πdi (a′), all a  a′.
Proof. Recall that πdi (a) ≡ πi

adi (a−i) , a−i

, with a−i ≡ a, and adi (a−i) ≡ argmaxai πi (ai, a−i).
From the deﬁnition of adi (a−i), we have πi

adi (a−i) , a−i
 ≥ πi adi a′−i , a−i, all a−i, a′−i. Next,
a i a′ here can be rewritten as a−i i a′−i, implying that πi

adi

a′−i

, a−i
 ≥ πi adi a′−i , a′−i.
This leads to πdi (a) ≥ πdi (a′) by transitivity.
A useful technical result is:
Lemma A-3. aP  a∗P if and only if a˜P  a∗P .
Proof. Suﬃciency: If a∗P  a˜P then πdi (a∗P ) ≤ 0 by (A5). Suppose that aP ≺ a∗P (which
implies that aP ≺ aNE because a˜P  aNE from Assumption (A5)), and look for a contradiction.
First recall that, absent the limited liability constraint, proﬁts π (a) are unbounded from below
by assumption, while best-reply proﬁts πdi (a) have a lower bound (a ﬁrm may always stop selling
from Assumption (A6)). Hence πdi (a) − π (a) is unbounded from above (i.e., the diﬀerence is
strictly larger than the constant πdi (am)− πm for a suﬃciently severe a in the absence of limited
liability constraint). Then suppose that πdi (aP )−π ≤ πdi (am)−πm, by continuity of πdi (.)−π (.)
there would exist a ≺ aP ≺ a∗P such that πdi (a)−π (a) = πdi (am)−πm, contradicting Lemma A-1
and Assumption (A7). Hence πdi (aP )−π > πdi (am)−πm. Next, by Lemma A-2, aP ≺ a∗P implies
πdi (aP ) ≤ πdi (a∗P ) hence πdi (aP ) ≤ 0. It follows that π < πm−πdi (am)+πdi (aP ) ≤ πm−πdi (am) ,
which clearly contradicts the deﬁnition of aP . As a result a˜P  a∗P implies aP  a∗P . Necessity:
If a˜P ≺ a∗P , suppose that aP  a∗P and look for a contradiction. By assumption aP  am, and
clearly π < 0 implies aP ≺ am. By Lemma A-1 and (A7), a∗P  aP ≺ am implies that πdi (aP )−π ≤
πdi (am)−πm. From the very deﬁnition of aP , it follows that πdi (aP ) ≤ 0 = πdi (a˜P ). By Lemma A-
2, this implies that aP  a˜P and by transitivity through a˜P ≺ a∗P , that aP ≺ a∗P , a contradiction.
Hence aP  a∗P implies a˜P  a∗P .
The latter three technical results are useful to establish Proposition 1, as follows. There are
three steps. First we solve a less constrained version of (1), in which (PC ) and (LLC ) are absent.
Then we reintroduce each of the latter two constraints separately, one after another.
1) Consider the δ-minimization problem without constraints (PC ) and (LLC ). The two
constraints (IC0-IC1) can be rewritten together as
X (δ) ≤ πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y (δ, aP ) , (12)
35
whereX (δ) ≡ πdi (am)− πm /δ and Y (δ, aP ) ≡ πm − πdi (aP ) / (1− δ) denote the lower-bound
and the upper-bound, respectively, of the proﬁt diﬀerential πm − π(aP ). (They are represented
in Fig. A-2.) We know that (a∗P , δ
∗) solves X (δ) = Y (δ, aP ) from Lemma 1.26 Together with
πdi (am)− πdi (a∗P ) = πm − π(a∗P ) from Lemma A-1, this leads to
δ∗ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π(a∗P )
. (13)
Then observe (i) from (IC1) that πdi (a
∗
P ) ≤ δπm+(1− δ)π(a∗P ); and (ii) that a∗P ≺ am implies
(1− δ) (π(a∗P )− πm) < 0, which can be rewritten as δπm + (1− δ)π(a∗P ) < πm. Then (i) and
(ii) together imply that πdi (a
∗
P ) < πm, and consequently π
d
i (a
∗
P )− π(a∗P ) < πm − π(a∗P ). As the
diﬀerence on the LHS is equal to πdi (am)− πm from Lemma A-1, we obtain that πdi (am)− πm <
πm − π(a∗P ), which implies from (13) that δ∗ < 1.
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Figure A-2: The two ICs in (IC0-IC1) can be rewritten X (δ) ≤ πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y (δ, aP ), with
X (δ) ≡

πdi (am)− πm

/δ and Y (δ, aP ) ≡

πm − π
d
i (aP )

/ (1− δ). Similarly, PC can be rewritten
πm − π(a
∗
P ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/(1− δ), and LLC can be rewritten πm − π(a
∗
P ) ≤ Y , where Y ≡ πm − π.
When PC and LLC are absent, the optimal punishment a∗P and the threshold δ
∗ are such that X(δ∗, a∗P ) = Y (δ
∗).
Here a∗P ≺ aP ≺ aP , therefore LLC binds. The limited liability constrained optimal punishment is aP , and ﬁrms
may implement am for all δ ≥ δ. The latter discount threshold is implicitly deﬁned by X (δ) = Y .
2) Introduce (PC ), in addition to (IC0-IC1). For aP = a∗P , recall that the latter two con-
straints imply X (δ) ≤ πm−π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P ), while the participation constraint can be rewritten
26Deviation proﬁts πdi (aP ) have a lower bound (a ﬁrm may always stop selling; see (A6)), all aP . Therefore
limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > Y (0, aP ) = πm − π
d
i (aP ), and X (1) = π
d
i (am) − πm < limδ→1 Y (δ, aP ) = +∞. Hence
there always exists δ∗(aP ) in [0, 1) verifying X (δ∗(aP )) = Y (δ∗(aP ), aP ), all aP .
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πm − π(a∗P ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ).
There are two cases:
(i) If aP ≺ a∗P then a˜P ≺ a∗P , from Lemma A-3. Then we know from (PC ) that Y (δ) > Y (δ, a∗P )
for all δ ∈ [0, 1), and the participation constraint is slack for aP = a∗P and δ = δ∗.
(ii) If a∗P  aP then a∗P  a˜P , from Lemma A-3. Then we know from (PC ) that Y (δ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P )
for all δ ∈ [0, 1). When the inequality sign is strict, (PC ) is violated for aP = a∗P and δ = δ∗.
Next, toward a participation-constrained solution, substitute (PC ) for (IC1), or equivalently
Y (δ) for Y (δ, aP ) in (12). (See Fig. A-2.) The negative slope of X (δ), the positive slope of Y (δ),
together with the continuity of π(.), imply that the minimizer aP and the minimum δ verify
X

δ

= πm − π = Y

δ

.27 This leads to
δ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π , (14)
and then one checks that Y

δ
 ≤ Y δ, aP . Recalling that π = πm − πdi (am) by (implicit)
deﬁnition of aP , from (14) we have δ < 1 if and only if πdi (am) − πm < πm −

πm − πdi (am)

,
which is true for all πm > 0.
(iii) Clearly if aP ≻ (=)aP , then any (δ, aP ), with δ ≥ δ, also veriﬁes (LLC ).
3) Introduce (LLC ), in addition to (IC0-IC1). Observe that the limited liability constraint
can be rewritten πm − π(aP ) ≤ Y , where Y ≡ πm − π. There are two cases:
(i) If aP ≺ a∗P we have π < π (a∗P ), hence (LLC ) is slack for aP = a∗P , all δ.
(ii) If a∗P  aP , we know from (LLC ) that Y ≤ X (δ∗) = πm − π(a∗P ) = Y (δ∗, a∗P ). When the
inequality sign is strict (LLC ) is violated for aP = a∗P and δ = δ
∗. Next, toward a limited liability
constrained solution, one substitutes (LLC ) for (IC1), or equivalently Y for Y (δ, aP ) in (12).
(See Fig. A-2.) Because Y is a constant, the slope of X (δ) is negative, and π(.) is continuous,
the minimizer aP and the minimum δ verify X (δ) = πm − π = Y .28 This leads to
δ =
πdi (am)− πm
πm − π . (15)
Then a∗P  aP  am together with assumption (A7) imply that δ ≥ π
d
i (aP )−π
πm−π , hence that
Y ≤ Y (δ, aP ). It is obvious from (15) that δ < (=)1 if and only if π < (=)πm−

πdi (am)− πm

.
27Note that limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > Y (0) = πm together with limδ→1X (δ) = π
d
i (am)−πm < limδ→1 Y (δ) = +∞
imply that there always exists δ in (0, 1) verifying X

δ

= Y

δ

.
28Since X (δ) is downward sloping, and limδ→0X (δ) = +∞ > X , there exists δ in (0, 1) verifying X (δ) = Y if and
only if limδ→1X (δ) < Y . This condition holds from Assumption (A8). Otherwise am would not be implementable.
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(iii) Clearly if aP ≻ (=)aP , then any (δ, aP ), with δ ≥ δ, also veriﬁes (PC ). 
A.2 Multi-Period Punishments
We ﬁrst prove Lemma 2, which is needed in the proof of Proposition 2, that follows.
Proof of Lemma 2. In (MIC 0), the expression on the RHS of the weak inequality sign simpliﬁes
to
l
k=1
δk [πm − π(aP,k)]. It is clearly monotone increasing when either aP,k decreases, all k ≥ 1,
or when δ increases, the LHS expression (which does not depend on punishment levels) remaining
constant. In (MIC 1), the expression on the RHS of the weak inequality sign can be rewritten
δ [(1− δ)V1 (aP , δ)− π (aP,1)]. It is monotone increasing when aP,k increases (since δ (1− δ) > 0),
for all k > 1, the LHS expression (a function of aP,1 only) remaining constant. Then for any given
aP,1, suppose that aP,2, . . . , aP,l are such that δ takes the lowest possible value for which (MIC 0-
MIC 1) hold true. There are three possible cases: either the two inequalities are slack, or only
one, or none. (i) If none of the two constraints binds, by continuity, one may obviously reduce δ
by an arbitrarily small amount so that both constraints remain veriﬁed, contradicting the claim
that there is no lower discount factor verifying (MIC 0) and (MIC 1). (ii) If exactly one of the
two constraints binds, pick any k > 1 such that aP,k ≺ am. Then by continuity, one may reduce
δ and adjust aP,k so that the RHS expression of the binding constraint remains constant, while
the other constraint remains satisﬁed, contradicting again the initial supposition. Therefore it
must be the case that, given aP,1, (MIC 0-MIC 1) hold with an equality sign when aP,2, . . . , aP,l
are such that δ is minimized. 
Proof of Proposition 2. There are two steps: (1) We investigate a less constrained version
of the problem (7) by leaving aside the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints together
with (MPC ) and (MLLC ), to keep only (MIC 0) and (MIC 1). This is done by capitaliz-
ing on Lemma 2: we solve in (δ, V1) the system (MIC 0-MIC 1) with equality signs, to obtain
(δ∗(aP,1), V1(aP , δ∗(aP,1))); then we identify the level of aP,1 that minimizes δ∗(aP,1) under the
feasibility constraint that V1(aP , δ
∗(aP,1)) ≤ Vl (aP , δ∗(aP,1)) = πm/ (1− δ∗(aP,1)). This leads
to the minimizer a∗P,1 = a
∗
P . (2) We show that (δ
∗(a∗P ), V1(aP , δ
∗(a∗P ))) satisﬁes all incentive
constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) as well as (MPC -MLLC ).
(1) Consider the δ-minimization problem with the two incentive constraints (MIC 0) and (MIC 1)
only. Observing that Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ), the two constraints become
X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ)− V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Y (δ, aP,1) , (16)
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where X (δ) ≡ πdi (am)− πm /δ and Y (δ, aP,1) ≡ πm − πdi (aP,1) / (1− δ) denote the lower-
bound and the upper-bound, respectively, of the value diﬀerential V0 (am, δ) − V0 (aP , δ) =
V0 (am, δ)− π (aP,1)− δV1 (aP , δ). Given aP,1, from Lemma 2 we know that (16) must hold with
an equality sign throughout for δ to be minimized. Solving X (δ) = Y (δ, aP ) in (δ, V1(aP , δ)), we
ﬁnd
δ∗(aP,1) =
πdi (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi (aP,1)
, (17)
and
V1(aP , δ
∗(aP,1)) =

πdi (am)− πdi

a∗P,1
πdi

a∗P,1

− π

a∗P,1

πdi (am)− πm
+
πdi

a∗P,1

πm − πdi

a∗P,1

 . (18)
Observe from the monotonicity of πdi (aP,1) in aP,1 (Lemma A-2) that δ
∗(aP,1) is monotone non-
decreasing in aP,1. Therefore the lowest value of δ∗(aP,1) is obtained for the most severe ﬁrst-period
punishment aP,1 compatible with the feasibility constraints of the problem. Note in particular from
(5) that aP,1 must be such that Vs (aP , δ) ≤ Vt (aP , δ) ≤ Vl (aP , δ) = πm/ (1− δ), all s ≤ t ≤ l.
Then V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm/ (1− δ), together with (17) and (18), becomes
πm − πdi (aP,1)

1− π
d
i (aP,1)− π (aP,1)
πdi (am)− πm

≥ 0. (19)
Clearly πm−πdi (aP,1) for all aP,1  aNE (since the monotonicity of πdi (aP ) implies that πdi (aP,1) ≤
πdi (aNE) = π(aNE), while π(aNE) < πm for all aNE ≺ am). It follows from (19) that the term
between rounded brackets must be non-negative. This implies that
πdi (aP,1)− π (aP,1) ≤ πdi (am)− πm. (20)
Recalling from Lemma A-1 that πdi (a
∗
P )−π(a∗P ) = πdi (am)−πm, from Assumption (A7) we obtain
that aP,1 cannot be strictly more severe than a∗P .
(2) Substitute a∗P for aP,1 in (17 − 18), and also πdi (am) − πm for πdi (a∗P ) − π(a∗P ), again from
Lemma A-1, to obtain
δ∗(a∗P ) = δ
∗ ≡ π
d
i (am)− πm
πdi (am)− πdi

a∗P
 ,
and
V ∗1 (a
∗
P , δ
∗(a∗P )) =
πm
1− δ∗ .
It follows directly from the later equation that V ∗1 (a
∗
P , δ
∗(a∗P )) = Vl(aP , δ
∗(a∗P )), implying that
π

a∗P,k

= πm, all k > 1. This says that a∗P = (a
∗
P , am, . . . , am) when the only the two incentive
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constraints in (MIC 0) and (MIC 1) are considered. Next, observe from the deﬁnition of con-
tinuation proﬁts in (5) that a∗P,k = am, all k > 1, implies that V1 (a
∗
P , δ) = Vs (a
∗
P , δ), all s. It
follows that the last l− 1 multi-period incentive constraints are all identical to the ﬁrst one, that
is (MIC 0), implying that all constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) are satisﬁed. Since a∗P  aP , aP it is
also plain that (MPC ) and (MLLC ) are satisﬁed. Therefore the solution to the less constrained
problem is also a solution to (7), and the punishment (a∗P , am, . . . , am) is optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 3. There are two steps: (1) In addition to (MIC 0) and (MIC 1), we
introduce (MPC ) in the less constrained version of (7), the last l − 1 multi-period incentive
constraints and (MLLC ) being left aside. We show that (MPC ) is stronger than (IC1) if a∗P  a˜P .
Then am is implementable with the l-period punishment aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) if δ = δ, that is
the lower bound to the interval of δ for which (MIC 0) and (MPC ) are compatible. (2) We obtain
that (δ, aP ) satisﬁes all other incentive constraints (MIC 2-MIC l), in which case δ is a solution
of (7) and aP is optimal.
(1) Introduce the multi-period participation constraint (MPC ) in addition to (MIC 0-MIC l). For
aP = a
∗
P ≡ (a∗P , am, . . . , am) recall that the ﬁrst two incentive constraints in (MIC 0) and (MIC 1)
can be rewritten X (δ) ≤ V0 (am, δ) − V0 (a∗P , δ) ≤ Y (δ,a∗P ), while (MPC ) can be rewritten
V0 (am, δ)− V0 (a∗P , δ) ≤ Y (δ), with Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). If aP  a∗P we know from Lemma A-3
that a˜P  a∗P , in which case πdi (a∗P ) ≤ 0 from (A5). This implies that Y (δ) ≤ Y (δ, a∗P ) for any
δ ∈ [0, 1). When the inequality sign is strict (MPC ) is stronger than (MIC 1), and thus is violated
for aP = a∗P and δ = δ
∗. Next, toward a participation-constrained solution, substitute (MPC )
for (MIC 1). From Proposition 1, in the single-period punishment case we know that (IC0) and
(PC ) are satisﬁed if aP = aP and δ ≥ δ, implying that in the multi-period setup (MIC 0) and
(MPC ) are satisﬁed as well if aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am) and δ ≥ δ. Therefore, there is at least one
punishment aP for which am is implementable with δ = δ. Then recall from Lemma 3 that δ is
the lowest value of δ compatible with (MIC 0) and (MPC ). This is suﬃcient to conclude that δ
is a solution to the δ-minimization problem under the constraints (MIC 0), (MIC 1), (MPC ).
(2) Observe from the deﬁnition of continuation proﬁts in (5) that aP,k = am for all k > 1 implies
that Vs (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ), all s > 1. It follows the last l − 1 multi-period incentive constraints
are all identical to (MIC 0), implying that all constraints in (MIC 0-MIC l) are satisﬁed. Clearly
if aP ≻ (=)aP , then

δ,aP

also veriﬁes (MLLC ). Therefore δ is a solution to (7), and the
punishment (aP , am, . . . , am) is optimal, all l. 
Proof of Remark 3. Recall from proof of Proposition 3 that (MIC 0) is written as X (δ) ≤
V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ), and (MPC ) as V0 (am, δ)−V0 (aP , δ) ≤ Y (δ), withX (δ) ≡

πdi (am)− πm

/δ
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and Y (δ) ≡ πm/ (1− δ). If (aP , δ) = (aP , δ) and aP ≻ a∗P we know that X

δ

= V0

am, δ
 −
V0

aP , δ

= Y (δ), where aP ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am), while all other multi-period incentive constraints
are satisﬁed also. Given δ, consider a change from aP to a′P , with a
′
P,1 ≻ aP and a′P,k  am for
some k > 1, that veriﬁes V0 (aP , δ) − V0 (a′P , δ) = 0. For all l > 1, the continuity of π(aP,k) in
aP,k implies that the number of solutions a′P to the latter equation is inﬁnite. By the very nature
of the change both constraints (MIC 0) and (MPC ) remain exactly satisﬁed, while by continuity
(MIC 1) remains satisﬁed as well for a suﬃciently small adjustment (it was slack for aP,1 = aP ).
Moreover, the l − 1 remaining multi-period incentive constraints in (MIC 2-MIC l) are relaxed
as a result of an adjustment from am “down” to a′P,k ≺ am in any of the k > 1 following pe-
riods of punishment, all other things remaining equal. It follows that am is implementable if
(aP , δ) = (a
′
P , δ). 
We now introduce two additional technical results which are needed to prove Proposition 4.
Lemma A-4. For all V verifying π < (1− δ)V ≤ πm, there exists a ﬁnite l and a punishment
aP ≡ (aP , aP,2, . . . , aP,k, . . . , aP,l), with aP,k  aP for all k > 1, such that V1 (aP , δ) = V .
Proof. There are three steps: (1) we show that, given any δ, for any l ≥ 2 there exists a
punishment alP of length l such that V1 (aP , δ) = V for any V in a closed interval Il we deﬁne;
(2) we establish that the upper-bound of Il+1 is the lower bound of Il so that their ﬁnite union
IL = ∪Ll=1Il is itself a closed interval; (3) we conclude by evidencing that the lower and upper
bounds of the union of intervals are respectively π/ (1− δ) and πm/ (1− δ).
(1) Deﬁne alP ≡ (alP,1, alP,2, . . . , alP,k, . . . , alP,l), where alP,k = aP for all k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, and
alP  aP . Here ﬁrms opt for the most severe action aP in the ﬁrst l − 1 periods, and for a
possibly softer action in the l-th period. In the latter ﬁnal period, the continuity of π in alP
implies that π(alP ) may take any value in [π(aP ), πm]. Let a
l
P and a
l
P denote the just deﬁned
penal code alP where a
l
P,l = aP and a
l
P,l = am respectively. By deﬁnition, for any value V in
Il = [V1

alP , δ

, V1

alP , δ

], there exists alP such that V1

alP , δ

= V .
(2) Clearly, V1

alP , δ

= V1

al+1P , δ

so that IL = ∪Ll=1Il = [V1

aLP , δ

, V1

a1P , δ

] for any integer
L > 1.
(3) From the deﬁnition of continuation proﬁts in (5) we know that V1

a1P , δ

= πm/ (1− δ), while
V1

aLP , δ

veriﬁes
(1− δ)V1

aLP , δ

= π + δl−1 (πm − π) .
Since limL→∞(π+δL−1 (πm − π)) = π, for any V > π/ (1− δ) there exists a ﬁnite L such that
π+ δL−1 (πm − π) ≤ (1− δ)V so that V ∈ [V1

aLP , δ

, V1

a1P , δ

], and there exists a punishment
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proﬁle alP , with l ≤ L, such that V1

alP , δ

= V .
We may now use Lemma A-4.
Proof of Proposition 4. As we are interested in establishing implementability for δ ≥ δM ≡
sup{δ, δ′}, there are two cases that depend on the comparison of δ′ and δ. In both cases: (1)
we establish that there exists a ﬁnite punishment, we denote aP , which is such that V1 (aP , δ) is
equal to a particular value we explicit; (2) we check that all incentive constraints are satisﬁed; (3)
we also verify that the participation and limited liability constraints hold.
(δ′ ≥ δ ⇒ δM = δ′)
(1) Deﬁne implicitly aP , speciﬁed to take the form of a
l
P as introduced in Lemma A-4 (so that
(MLLC ) is satisﬁed) by
V1 (aP , δ) =
1
1− δ

π +
πdi (aP )− π
δ

, (21)
which describes continuation proﬁts from the 2nd period of punishment onward.29 Given δ, from
Lemma A-4 a suﬃcient condition for aP to be well deﬁned is π < (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm. To
check this holds, consider the two inequalities in turn: (i) We have π < (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) since
πdi (aP )− π

/δ > 0 (by deﬁnition), for all δ > 0. (ii) Toward V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm/(1− δ) ﬁrst note
that aP  a∗P implies that πdi (am) − πm ≥ πdi (aP ) − π(aP ) from Assumption (A7) and Lemma
A-1. From the expression of δ′, as displayed in Lemma 4, it follows that
δ′ ≤ π
d
i (am)− πm
πm − π(aP )
. (22)
Then pick δ = δ′. Now (22), and X

δ′
 ≡ πdi (am)− πm /δ′ = V0 am, δ′ − V0 aP , δ′, imply
that πm − π(aP ) ≤ V0

am, δ
′ − V0 aP , δ′. Moreover, substituting 1− δ′V0 am, δ′ for πm
in the latter expression leads to V0

aP , δ
′ ≤ δ′V0 am, δ′ + π(aP ). Then substituting π(aP ) +
δ′V1

aP , δ
′ for V0 aP , δ′ results in 1− δ′V1 aP , δ′ ≤ πm, as needed. As (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) is
monotone decreasing in δ, it follows that (1− δ)V1 (aP , δ) ≤ πm for all δ ≥ δ′. Eventually, (i)
and (ii) establish that there exists at least one aP for a ﬁnite l such that V1 (aP , δ) satisﬁes (21)
for all δ ≥ δ′.
(2) Recall from the proof of Lemma 4 that for collusion to be implemented at δ = δ′, it must be the
case that the two constraints (MIC 0) and (MIC 1) are binding and that aP,1 = aP . Therefore,
for aP = aP ≡ (aP , aP , . . . , aP , aP,l), where aP,l  aP (i.e., the same vector as introduced in
29 In order to obtain the expression in (21), substitute aP for aP,1, and aP for aP , in (MIC 1) written with an
equality sign, and reorganize terms.
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the proof of Lemma A-4), if δ = δ′ we have that (MIC 0-MIC 1) are exactly satisﬁed. Clearly,
Vk+1 (aP , δ) is strictly increasing in k as long as 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1. Since πdi

aP,k
 − π(aP,k) is
identical for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1, if (MIC 1) holds and is binding, it must be the case that all
constraints (MIC 2) , . . . , (MIC l − 1) hold also and are slack. Finally, to check that the last
incentive constraint (MIC l) is also satisﬁed, we compare it with (MIC 0). First, observe that the
terms on the RHS of the inequality sign are the same in the two constraints, because Vl (aP , δ) =
V0 (am, δ), all aP . Next, consider the terms on the LHS of the inequality side of (MIC l). There is
no loss of generality in assuming that aP,l ≺ am. (If there is equality, collusion can be implemented
by the means of a l − 1 punishment scheme where aP,l−1 = aP ≺ am). Assuming this is the case,
we know from Assumption (A7) and Lemma A-1 that πdi (aP,l)−π(aP,l) < (=)πdi (am)−πm, for all
aP,l ≻ (=)a∗P (as in the present case, since here aP,l  aP  a∗P ). Therefore, if (MIC 0) holds and
is binding, it must be the case that (MIC l) holds also and is slack. This says that, in the absence
of participation constraint, am is implementable with at least one l-punishment vector, that is
aP = aP , when δ = δ
′. Since for aP = aP all MIC s (MIC 0-MIC l) are monotone increasing in
δ, this also holds for all δ ≥ δ′.
(3) Consider now the participation constraint. If δ ≤ δ′, then the comparison of the developed
expressions for the two thresholds implies that πdi (am)−πdi (aP ) ≤ πm−π. Since π = πm−πdi (am)
by deﬁnition, we have πdi (aP ) ≥ 0. Since V0 (aP , δ) = π + δV1 (aP , δ), with V1 (aP , δ) as in (21),
and aP as deﬁned above in (1), we have V0 (aP , δ) ≥ 0, which says that the participation constraint
(MPC ) is also satisﬁed for aP = aP and δ ≥ δ′. This says that am is implementable with a ﬁnite
punishment scheme for all δ ≥ δ′. Then recall from Lemma 4 that the lowest δ compatible with
(MIC 0-MIC 1) and (MLLC ) is δ′. It follows that δ′ is the lowest possible discount factor that
implements am.
(δ > δ′ ⇒ δM = δ)
(1) We proceed as in the previous case to deﬁne implicitly a¯P by
V1 (a¯P , δ) = −π
δ
. (23)
Again, we must check that a¯P satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition introduced in Lemma A-4, that is
π < − (1−δ)
δ
π ≤ πm, for all δ ≥ δ.30 The LHS inequality is always satisﬁed for δ ∈ (0, 1]. On the
RHS, aP  aP implies that π ≥ π = πm−πdi (am), recalling that the latter equality is the implicit
30 In order to obtain the expression in (23), substitute aP for aP,1, and a¯P for aP , in (MPC ) written with an
equality sign for s = 0, and reorganize terms.
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deﬁnition of aP . As a result −(1−δ)δ π ≤ πm, which extends to any δ ≥ δ by monotonicity. Hence
there exists at least one a¯P for a ﬁnite l such that V1 (a¯P , δ) satisﬁes (23) for any δ ≥ δ.
(2) At δ = δ, we check that (MIC 0-MIC 1) are satisﬁed for aP = a¯P ≡ (aP , am, . . . , am), so that
aP,1 = aP , and (MLLC ) is satisﬁed by construction). Indeed X

δ

= V0

am, δ
 − V0 a¯P , δ <
Y

δ, aP

with X

δ

= πdi (am), Y

δ, aP

= πdi (am)

1− πdi (aP )πm

> πdi (am) since π
d
i (aP ) < 0,
and V0

am, δ
−V0 a¯P , δ = V0 am, δ = πm1−δ = πdi (am). Again, Vk+1 (a¯P , δ) is strictly increasing
in k as long as 1 ≤ k ≤ l− 1. Since πdi (aP,k)−π(aP,k) is identical for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l− 1, if (MIC 1)
is satisﬁed, it must be the case all constraints (MIC 1) , . . . , (MIC l − 1) are also satisﬁed. As
for the last incentive constraint, that is (MIC l), we compare it with (MIC 0). The terms on the
RHS of the inequality sign are the same in the two constraints, because Vl (aP , δ) = V0 (am, δ),
all aP . On the LHS, there is no loss of generality in assuming that aP,l ≺ am. (If there is
equality, collusion can be implemented by the means of a l−1 punishment scheme where aP,l−1 =
aP ≺ am). Assuming this is the case, we know from Assumption (A7) and Lemma A-1 that
πdi (aP,l) − π(aP,l) < πdi (am) − πm, for all aP,l ≻ (=)a∗P , as in the present case. Therefore, if
(MIC 0) holds and is binding, it must be the case that (MIC l) holds also and is slack. We obtain
that all incentive constraints are satisﬁed. Again, since for aP = a¯P all MICs (MIC 0-MIC l)
are monotone increasing in δ, this also holds for all δ ≥ δ.
(3) By construction, from (23), V0 (a¯P , δ) = 0 hence (MPC ) is satisﬁed for all δ. Given the
structure of a¯P , (MLLC ) is also satisﬁed. This says that am is implementable with a ﬁnite
punishment scheme for all δ ≥ δ. Then recall from Lemma 3 that the lowest δ compatible with
(MIC 0-MIC 1) and (MPC ) is δ. It follows that δ is the lowest possible discount factor that
implements am. 
Proof of Remark 4. Consider again the punishment proﬁle of Lemma A-4, that is alP ≡
(alP,1, a
l
P,2, . . ., a
l
P,k, . . . , a
l
P,l), where a
l
P,k = aP for all k = 1, 2, . . . , l − 1, and alP,l  aP . We
know from Proposition 4 that there exists a punishment proﬁle of this kind that allows ﬁrms to
implement am for δ = δM . We also have shown that, for this punishment proﬁle, the (MIC l)
constraint holds and is slack. One may construct a l + 1 period punishment proﬁle identical to
alP up to the period k = l − 1 and with a˚P,l ≻ alP,l and a˚P,l+1 ≺ am such that
π (aP,l) + δπm = π (˚aP,l) + δπ (˚aP,l+1)
and all incentive constraints are satisﬁed. 
Proof of Proposition 5. It is assumed that aP ≻ a∗P , aP . To see that δM < δ, recall that
δM ≡ sup{δ′, δ} and consider the two possible cases: (i) If δM = δ then it suﬃces to recall
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that aP ≻ a∗P , aP implies δ > δ (see Remark 1) to conclude. (ii) If δM = δ′ then compare the
expressions of the denominators of δ′ and δ. We have πdi (am) − πdi (aP ) > πm − π if and only if
πdi (am)− πm > πdi (aP )− π. To establish the latter property, recall from Assumption (A7) that
there exists a unique aˇ ≺ am such that πdi (am)− πm = πdi (aˇ)− π (aˇ), and from Lemma A-1 that
aˇ = a∗P . Therefore, here aP = a∗P implies that either πdi (am) − πm < πdi (aP ) − π, which is not
possible (the incentive to deviate from am is an upper bound to a ﬁrm’s incentive to deviate from
any a, see comment below Lemma A-1), or πdi (am)− πm > πdi (aP )− π, which thus holds.
For the comparison of δM with the other discount thresholds, there are two cases. Suppose
ﬁrst that a∗P  aP , to compare δM with δ∗ (regime 1). From Remark 2 we obtain directly that
δ∗ < δM . Suppose next that aP ≻ a∗P , to compare δM with δ (regime 2). From the deﬁnition
of δM we obtain directly that δM ≥ δ. Finally, to demonstrate that δM = δ if and only if
a˜P  aP ≻ aP ≻ a∗P , note that a˜P  aP if and only if πdi (aP ) ≤ 0 from Assumption (A5), and
equivalently πdi (am)−πdi (aP ) ≥ πdi (am). Recalling that πm−π = πdi (am) by (implicit) deﬁnition
of aP , it follows that a˜P  aP if and only if δ ≡ π
d
i (am)−πm
πm−π =
πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)
≥ δ′ ≡ πdi (am)−πm
πdi (am)−πdi (aP )
,
establishing that δM = δ (by deﬁnition), as needed. 
A.3 A Linear Example
In this appendix we compute the speciﬁc algebraic expressions we need for the analysis of the
linear example in section 5. Inverse demand functions for ﬁrm i and all other symmetric ﬁrms j
are given by (9) and (10). Therefore symmetric proﬁts are
π(q) =

(1− q (1 + γ(n− 1))− c)q if q ≤ q
P
≡ 11+γ(n−1)
−cq if q ≥ q
P
, (24)
where the piecewise structure results from the non-negativity constraint we impose on prices (solve
1− qi − γ(n− 1)qj ≥ 0 for qi = qj = q to ﬁnd q ≤ qP ≡ 1(1+γ(n−1))). The collusive quantity and
corresponding proﬁts are q∗m =
1−c
2(1+γ(n−1)) and π
∗
m =
(1−c)2
4(1+γ(n−1)) , respectively (there is perfect
collusion, with π∗m ≡ π (q∗m)). The one-shot best deviation proﬁts are
πdi (q) =

1
4 (1− c− γ (n− 1) q)2 if q ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1)
0 otherwise
, (25)
where q˜P is the solution to πdi (q) = 0 (here f = 0 implies q˜P = qˆP , see (A5) and (A6)). Since
q∗m < q˜P for all parameter values, ﬁrm i’s best-reply proﬁts, when each ﬁrm in N\{i} sells q∗m,
are πdi (q
∗
m) =
(1−c)2
16
(γ(n−1)+2)2
(1+γ(n−1))2 , from (25).
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A.3.1 Implementability (feasibility of collusion)
In the single-period benchmark set-up (section 3), consider the expression of δ in (2). We have
δ ≤ 1 if and only if c ≥ c˜, where
c˜ ≡
γ2 (n− 1)2 + 4 (γ (n− 1) + 1)− 4

γ2 (n− 1)2 (1 + γ (n− 1))
γ2 (n− 1)2 − 4 (γ (n− 1) + 1) ,
which is the only admissible root to π = π∗m−

πdi (q
∗
m)− π∗m

, the second root being negative for
all γ, n. Given n ≥ 2, we have c˜ ≥ 0 if on and only if γ ≥ γˇ ≡ 21+
√
2
n−1 . Note that inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if
and only if n < 6. Hence c˜ is positive only when n ≥ 6. In that case, q∗m cannot be implemented
with a single-period scheme for all c < c˜ (see Fig. 1).
Now we check that q∗m can always be implemented for some δ suﬃciently high in the multi-
period punishment case (section 4). Recall that δM ≡ sup{δ′, δ}. We know from Lemma 3 that
δ < 1 for all π∗m > 0, and from Lemma 4 that δ
′ < 1 if and only if πdi (qP ) < π
∗
m. Then from (25)
there are two cases: if c > 11+γ(n−1) , or equivalently qP > q˜P , we have π
d
i (qP ) = 0 < π
∗
m for all
π∗m > 0; otherwise πdi (qP ) < π
∗
m if and only if 0 ≤ c ≤ c˜′, where
c˜′ ≡ 1
1 + γ (n− 1) .
This is the only admissible root to πdi (qP ) = π
∗
m, the second root being negative for all γ, n. Then
it is suﬃcient to observe that c˜′ > 11+γ(n−1) to verify that π
d
i (qP ) < π
∗
m.
A.3.2 Calculation of the discount thresholds
For all qP > q∗m one must consider the two forms of π
d
i (qP ), that depend on the comparison of qP
with q˜P . This leads to two cases:
(1) If qP ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1) best-reply proﬁts are πdi (qP ) = 14 (1− c− γ (n− 1)) q)2 and (PC )
is slack. When only (IC0) and (IC1) are considered, we know (from Lemma 1) that the
optimal punishment q∗P is a solution in qP of π
d
i (qP )−π (qP ) = πdi (q∗m)−π∗m. The only two
solutions are q∗m, which does not apply as a punishment; the other one is
q∗P =
1− c
2
3γ(n− 1) + 2
[2 + γ(n− 1)] [1 + γ(n− 1)] .
The latter punishment quantity is deﬁned only when lower than q˜P , which holds if and only
if γ ≤ inf {γˇ, 1}, recalling that γˇ ≡ 21+
√
2
n−1 and inf {γˇ, 1} = 1 if and only if n < 6. The
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threshold value for δ is
δ∗ =
1
16
[2 + γ (n− 1)]2
1 + γ (n− 1) < 1. (26)
This is Regime 1 (see (2)). Next, we ﬁnd q∗P ≤ qP , so that the price pi(q∗P , q∗P ) is non-negative
and (LLC ) is slack if and only if c ≥ c′, with
c′ ≡ γ (n− 1)− 2
3γ(n− 1) + 2 . (27)
The frontier c′ intersects the line c = 0 from below at γ = γˆ ≡ 2n−1 . Therefore there exists
c′ > 0 if and only if 2n−1 < 1 (one checks that γˆ < γˇ for all n ≥ 2), or equivalently n > 3,
otherwise c′ = 0 for all parameter values. Whenever c < c′ we have q
P
< q∗P ≤ q˜P and
(LLC ) binds. (Here q∗P ≤ q˜P is implied by γ ≤ inf {γˇ, 1}.) This is regime 3.
(2) If qP > q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1) best-reply proﬁts are πdi (qP ) = 0 and (IC1) is identically equal to
(PC ). (This holds because f = 0, otherwise f > 0 would imply that (IC1) is strictly
weaker than (PC ).) It follows from the previous case (where qP ≤ q˜P ≡ 1−cγ(n−1)) that we
need only consider γ ≥ γˇ and n ≥ 6 to complete the analysis. There are two solutions in qP
to −π (qP ) = πdi (q∗m)− π∗m, the equation that deﬁnes qP implicitly. The ﬁrst one is strictly
less than q˜P for all c < 1, therefore it is not admissible; the second one is then
qP =
1− c
4
2 [1 + γ(n− 1)] + [2 + γ(n− 1)]1 + γ (n− 1)
[1 + γ(n− 1)]2 ,
which we check is always strictly higher than q˜P . Then the threshold value for δ now is
δ =

γ (n− 1)
2 + γ (n− 1)
2
< 1. (28)
This is Regime 2 (see (2)). Next, we ﬁnd qP < (=)qP , so that the price pi(qP , qP ) is
non-negative and (LLC ) is slack if and only if c > (=)c′′, with
c′′ ≡

1 + γ(n− 1) [2 + γ(n− 1)]− 2 [1 + γ (n− 1)]
1 + γ(n− 1) [2 + γ(n− 1)] + 2 [1 + γ(n− 1)] . (29)
The frontier c′′ intersects from below the line c = 0 if γ = 0, and c′′ > 0 otherwise. Therefore
c′′ > 0 for all γ ≥ γˇ. Whenever c < c′′ we have q
P
< qP ≤ q∗P and (LLC ) binds. (Here
qP ≤ q∗P is implied by γ ≥ γˇ and n ≥ 6.) This is regime 3.
The two preceding paragraphs delineate the parameter subsets in which regimes 1 and 2 apply,
respectively. (In the latter case, since f = 0, note that (IC1) being identical to (PC ) implies that
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regimes 1 and 2 coincide for all points (n, γ, c) verifying n ≥ 6, γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1, and c′′ ≤ c < 1.) All
points in the parameter set where regime 3 applies were also identiﬁed. In the latter regime, the
discount threshold δ solves πdi (q
∗
m)− π∗m = δ

π∗m − π(qP )

. As the speciﬁc algebraic form of the
latter expression does not depend on parameter values, for all n, γ, c there is a unique
δ =
1
4

1− c
1 + c
2 (n− 1)2 γ2
1 + γ (n− 1) . (30)
It remains to compute δM , the discount threshold when (LLC ) binds and ﬁrms design the
optimal l-period punishment scheme. We know (from Proposition 4) that δM = sup{δ′, δ}. Again
we know from (25) there are two cases: 1) if q
P
< q˜P , or equivalently c < 11+γ(n−1) , we have
πdi (qP ) =
1
4

1− c− γ (n− 1)) q
P
2
, which implies that
δM =
γ (n− 1) (1− c)2
(1 + c) [4 (1− c)− γ (n− 1) (3c− 1)] > δ; (31)
and 2) if q
P
≥ q˜P , or equivalently c ≥ 11+γ(n−1) , we have πdi (qP ) = 0, hence
δM =

γ (n− 1)
2 + γ (n− 1)
2
, (32)
which is the same expression as δ (regime 2), an illustration of Proposition 5.
A.3.3 Partition of the parameter space
The sections A.3.1 and A.3.2 lead to the partition of the parameter space (c, n, γ) in three subsets
where either Regime 1, 2, or 3 apply, as follows:
1) Regime 1 applies if and only if
(i) 2 ≤ n ≤ 3; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c < 1; or
(ii) 4 ≤ n ≤ 5; 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1; c′ ≤ c < 1; or
(iii) 6 ≤ n; 0 ≤ γ ≤ γˆ; 0 ≤ c < 1; or
(iv) 6 ≤ n; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ γˇ; c′ ≤ c < 1.
2) Regime 2 applies if and only if
6 ≤ n; γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1; c′′ ≤ c < 1.
3) Regime 3 applies if and only if
(i) n = 3; γ = γˆ = 1; c = c = 0; or
(ii) 4 ≤ n ≤ 5; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c ≤ c′; or
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(iii) 6 ≤ n; γˆ ≤ γ ≤ γˇ; 0 ≤ c ≤ c′; or
(iv) 6 ≤ n; γˇ ≤ γ ≤ 1; 0 ≤ c ≤ c′′.
In this partition the role of costs, given n and γ, can be illustrated by comparing q∗P and qP
with q
P
for any c deﬁned on [0, 1]. The punishment quantities are represented for all n ≥ 6, with
highly substitutable products in Fig. A-3(a), where γˇ < γ, and for more diﬀerentiated products
in Fig. A-3(b), where γ < γˆ. In both cases regime 3 applies when the constant cost parameter is
low, that is c ≤ c.
)(a
1=c
Pq
PP qq ˆ~ = Pq
P
q
0 cc ′′=
regime 3 regime 2
mq
1=c
Pq
mq
Pq*
P
q
0 cc ′=
regime 3 regime 1 )(b
PP qq ˆ~ =
Figure A-3: Thick lines represent optimal punishment quantities (all c, and n ≥ 6). In (a) products are highly
substitutable (γˇ < γ). Regime 3 applies for c ≤ c′′, and regime 2 applies otherwise. In (b) products are more
diﬀerentiated (γ < γˇ). Regime 3 applies for c ≤ c′, and regime 1 applies otherwise.
For higher levels of c we have regime 2 in (a), and regime 1 in (b). Note that the cost threshold
c is monotone increasing in n and γ (see (27-29)). The structural boundary level q
P
depends only
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on the number of competitors and demand parameters. It is monotone decreasing when either n
or γ increases, but constant in c. The optimal punishment quantities q∗P and qP are linear in the
cost parameter and monotone decreasing when it rises closer to 1. 
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